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THE POSSIBILITY OF TRANSFER(?): A
COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR
RWANDA’S RULE 11BIS TO PERMIT TRANSFER
TO RWANDAN DOMESTIC COURTS
Jesse Melman*
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’s (ICTR or Tribunal)
Rule of Procedure and Evidence 11bis allows the Tribunal to transfer
accused persons to domestic courts in order to expedite the hearing of the
thousands of genocide cases still waiting on the ICTR’s overloaded docket.
So long as certain baseline requirements are met, Rule 11bis, on its face,
does not distinguish between domestic Rwandan courts and other
jurisdictions. However, despite granting requests for transfer to other
countries’ courts, the Tribunal has repeatedly denied applications for
transfer to Rwanda notwithstanding numerous requests. Further, behind
such requests lies the pressing need to resolve all outstanding cases before
the Tribunal’s looming 2013 termination date.
This Note explores the requirements for a successful transfer to a
domestic jurisdiction set forth in Rule 11bis and how the Government of
Rwanda has labored, through legislated judicial reform, to meet those
requirements. After analyzing the history and founding principles behind
the formation of the ICTR, the Note then explores how the Tribunal has
applied the 11bis requirements for transfer applications to countries other
than Rwanda and to Rwanda itself, as well as the International Criminal
Tribunal for the former-Yugoslavia’s (ICTY) application of the Rule.
Finding an inconsistent application of the Rule between applications for
transfer outside Rwanda and to Rwanda itself, the Note offers a more
comprehensive balancing test that the ICTR should consider when
determining whether to transfer cases to domestic courts. Finally, this Note
argues that in weighing countervailing judicial interests expressed in the
formation of the ICTR against specific due process concerns, the Tribunal
may, in specific cases, be able to transfer cases to Rwanda, thus
contributing to the overall interests of justice and the utilitarian goal of
unloading the Tribunal’s docket.
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, Fordham University School of Law; M.A., 2008, The Hebrew
University of Jerusalem; B.A., 2005, University of Rochester. I would like to thank
Professor Justice Richard Goldstone for his insights, candor, and support. I would also like
to thank Ariella for her constant encouragement throughout the writing and editing process.
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INTRODUCTION
On November 3, 1999, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR or Tribunal) ruled that Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza’s one-and-one-half
year detention prior to being charged violated his human rights and
consequently ordered his release.1 The possible release of a man accused of
inciting mass genocide through the use of his radio station due to a
procedural technicality created an uproar in Rwanda, resulting in the
Rwandan government’s (GOR) severance of diplomatic relations with the
international court, which were not restored until February 2000.2 While
the court eventually revised its opinion to deny his release,3 this episode
illustrates the tension that may arise when an international court is charged
with adjudicating cases relating to mass atrocities that were carried out

1. See Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision, ¶ 106 (Nov.
3, 1999) [hereinafter Barayagwiza, Decision]; see Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the
Role and Effectiveness of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the Rwandan
National Justice System in Dealing with the Mass Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. INT’L L.J. 163,
180–81 (2000); Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis
in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221, 1284 (2000).
2. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1284; Carroll, supra note 1, at 180–81.
3. See Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision (Prosecutor’s
Request for Review or Reconsideration), ¶ 72 (Mar. 31, 2000) (holding that although the
defendant’s rights were violated, such violation does not merit dismissal of the charges and
release).
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against citizens of a specific sovereign nation.4 This has called into
question the primary purpose of such international tribunals: is their
mission to hold perpetrators of mass atrocity accountable and bring them to
justice or to serve the sometimes competing goals and interests of the
international legal community in establishing international legal norms,
which may involve a strict application of Western due process rights?5
From a practical perspective, the question was moot at the time of
Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza;6 Rwanda was still in the process of rebuilding
its judiciary after its total destruction during the 1994 Genocide and was
having a difficult enough time dealing with its overcrowded prisons and
broken judicial system.7 However, fifteen years after the genocide, Rwanda
has made great strides in developing a legal system8 and has adjudicated
more genocide cases than any other country in the world.9 In fact, the
ICTR Appeals Chamber has even noted the independence of the Rwandan
judiciary, pointing out that the courts and government continue to work
with the Tribunal despite the Tribunal’s acquittal of five defendants.10

4. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1285; Etelle R. Higonnet, Restructuring Hybrid Courts:
Local Empowerment and National Criminal Justice Reform, 23 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L.
347, 427 (2006).
5. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1285; see also Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or
Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and International
Criminal Tribunals, 23 YALE J. INT’L L. 383, 407–08 (1998) (emphasis omitted) (ad hoc
tribunals serve to address “fundamental humanitarian interests of concern” as well as
“threat[s] to international peace and security”); Frederik Harhoff, Consonance or Rivalry?
Calibrating the Efforts to Prosecute War Crimes in National and International Tribunals, 7
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 571, 584–85 (1997) (“One must always recognize that the
Tribunal was established not only to restore peace and justice in Rwanda, but also to
maintain international peace and security as a new institution which could pave the way for
the prevention of such atrocities in the future on a more general level. . . . [O]n this point,
the Tribunal has its own agenda.”).
6. Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision, ¶ 106 (Nov. 3, 1999).
7. See Jessica Raper, The Gacaca Experiment: Rwanda’s Restorative Dispute
Resolution Response to the 1994 Genocide, 5 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 1, 26–28 (2005).
8. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-01-67-R11bis, Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of Case to the Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 56 (Dec. 16, 2008)
[hereinafter Kayishema, Trial Chamber’s Transfer Decision] (“The Chamber concludes that
Rwanda has made notable progress in improving its judicial system.”); Prosecutor v. Gatete,
Case No. ICTR-2000-61-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the
Republic of Rwanda, ¶ 95 (Nov. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Gatete, Transfer Decision] (same);
Erike Møse, The ICTR’s Completion Strategy—Challenges and Possible Solutions, 6 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 667, 674 (2008) (noting that “Rwanda has made progress in reforming its
judicial system”).
9. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1287.
10. See Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-R11bis, Decision on the
Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis, ¶ 28 (Oct. 8, 2008)
[hereinafter Munyakazi, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision]. Further underscoring the
confidence that the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has in the Rwandan
judiciary, the ICTR Prosecutor recently declined to seek the referral of four former Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF) members who are currently being tried in Rwandan courts, noting that
the trial was open and public and that ICTR monitors confirmed that fair trial standards were
observed. See U.N. SCOR, 64th Sess., 6134th mtg. at 33, U.N. Doc. S/PV.6134 (June 4,
2009) [hereinafter Security Council Meeting 6134].
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At the same time, the ICTR jointly with its sister, the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former-Yugoslavia (ICTY), has proven to be very
expensive.11 Together, they account for over ten percent of the United
Nations’ overall budget, with the ICTR averaging $45.5 million per
conviction.12 In part because of this enormous expense, the Security
Council has mandated that the Tribunals begin to conclude their work.13 As
part of the ICTR’s completion strategy, in compliance with United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 150314 and 1534,15 the Prosecutor hopes to
transfer some of its remaining cases to Rwanda for adjudication by the
national courts.16
However, the ICTR’s Trial and Appeals Chambers’ strict application of
Rule 11bis of its Rules of Procedure and Evidence17 has prevented such
transfers.18 Most recently, the Appeals Chamber denied the transfer of
Ildephonse Hategekimana to Rwanda on the basis that Rwandan courts do
not provide sufficient fair trial guarantees as required under Rule 11bis.19
The ICTR continues to question the sufficiency of Rwandan law and
practice despite the fact that the Rwandan legislature has continuously
revised its genocide laws and laws pertaining to ICTR cases, particularly in
order to accord with ICTR requirements.20 In so doing, and in contrast with
its application of 11bis to requests for transfer to non-Rwandan venues,21
the ICTR not only looks to see whether Rwandan domestic law is sufficient
but also conducts a factual determination of whether such law is applied.22
As a result, the Tribunal, in the Rwandan context, approaches the 11bis
analysis as a mixed question of law and fact and thus finds grounds to
exclude transfer.23
This Note analyzes the arguments for and against transferring cases from
the ICTR to Rwandan domestic courts in light of the ICTR’s 11bis
procedural requirements and recent Rwandan legislation. While some

11. See Higonnet, supra note 4, at 427–29.
12. See id. at 427 & n.309.
13. See Daryl A. Mundis, The Judicial Effects of the “Completion Strategies” on the Ad
Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 143 (2005). But see RICHARD
J. GOLDSTONE & ADAM M. SMITH, INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS 103–04 (2009)
(noting in particular that the Tribunals were never intended to be permanent institutions).
14. S.C. Res. 1503, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003).
15. S.C. Res. 1534, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004).
16. See The President of the ICTR, Report on the Completion Strategy of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ¶ 50, delivered to the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/2009/247 (May 14, 2009) [hereinafter ICTR Completion Strategy, May 2009].
17. ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis.
18. ICTR Completion Strategy, May 2009, supra note 16, at ¶¶ 44, 50.
19. See Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-R11bis, Decision on the
Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis, ¶ 40 (Dec. 4, 2008)
[hereinafter Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision].
20. See, e.g., ICTR Completion Strategy, May 2009, supra note 16, at ¶ 50 (“The
Government of Rwanda is in the process of further amending its laws in order to remove any
remaining legal hurdles for the transfer of cases from the Tribunal to be heard in Rwanda.”).
21. See infra Part I.B.3.a–b.
22. See infra Part I.B.3.c.
23. See infra Part I.B.3.c.

1276

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

literature has focused on the issue of transferring cases from the ICTR to
Rwanda, such scholarly work has considered 11bis in the context of the
now obsolete pre-2007 Rwandan domestic law.24 This Note, then, aims to
revisit the transfer issue—in particular, the ICTR’s continual refusal to
transfer cases to Rwanda—in light of the country’s recent legislation and
judicial reform. In Part I, this Note discusses the background of the
formation of the ICTR, its jurisdictional relationship with domestic courts,
in particular Rwanda’s, and the applicable Rwandan laws pertaining to
genocide cases transferred from the ICTR. This Note then discusses the
ICTR’s methodology in determining whether to transfer a case to a national
jurisdiction. In so doing, this Note conducts a brief comparison with the
ICTY methodology, drawing upon rulings in referral cases from both
tribunals in order to illustrate how the Tribunal treats requests for transfers
to Rwanda differently from requests to other venues.
In Part II, this Note discusses the opposing viewpoints concerning the
transfer requirements, mainly those in support of the Tribunal’s emphasis
on due process requirements and those who advocate that the ICTR should
place greater importance on the overall purposes and goals of the Tribunal.
Finally, in Part III, this Note argues that when considering jurisdictional
limits and priorities in cases involving international courts and the courts of
the country in which and against whose citizens the crimes were committed,
countervailing judicial interests may outweigh an assurance of the strict
application of Western due process protections in the home country. A
multiplicity of factors—such as the contribution a particular case may have
toward furthering the Tribunal’s goals of facilitating the national justice and
reconciliation processes and buttressing the domestic judiciary—should be
weighed against the Tribunal’s interests in guaranteeing the defendants’
right to a fair trial through the assurance of specific due process protections.
Such a particularized assessment would comprise a comprehensive
balancing approach, considering both adequate due process protections for
the defendant and factors contributing to the overall interest of justice.
I. FROM THE KILLING FIELDS TO THE HALLS OF JUSTICE: THE RWANDAN
GENOCIDE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT IT CREATED, AND THE RESULTING
LEGAL REGIMES
This part explores the historical and legal background of the ICTR and
applicable transfer jurisprudence. Specifically, this section discusses the
post-genocide situation of Rwanda and its role in the formation of the
ICTR, the ICTR’s mandate in relation to courts of national jurisdiction, the
Tribunal’s and Rwanda’s transfer regimes, and, finally, how the ICTR has
applied its transfer requirements to Rwanda to date. This history illustrates
how, despite Rwanda’s efforts at creating a legal regime compliant with
24. See, e.g., Alhagi Marong, Charles Chernor Jalloh & David Kinnecome, Concurrent
Jurisdiction and the ICTR: Should the Tribunal Refer Cases to Rwanda?, in FROM HUMAN
RIGHTS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 159, 165 (Emmanuel Decaux, Adam Dieng &
Malick Sow eds., 2007). See generally infra Part II.A.
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ICTR standards and its own national interest in adjudicating these genocide
cases, the Tribunal continues to insist that the Rwandan system falls short
of meeting its stringent transfer requirements.
A. The 100 Days and Its Court: The Rwandan Genocide and the
Establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
1. General History of the Genocide and the Need for an International Court
In 1994, Rwanda witnessed the most brutal genocide the world has seen
since the Holocaust. In less than 100 days, the extremist Hutu Power
regime mobilized the masses to massacre around 500,000 to 1,000,000
fellow Rwandans, targeted for their Tutsi “ethnicity” or moderate Hutu
views.25 The machetes of the Hutu killing machine exceeded the Nazis’
profane efficiency at its peak, at a killing rate five times higher than that of
the Nazi apparatus.26 After the advancing Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)
defeated the genocidal regime, the country was left in shambles and the
judiciary was utterly destroyed.27 Not one court was left operating28 and of
the roughly 800 lawyers and judges in Rwanda before the genocide, only
forty were still alive.29 The population was traumatized and impoverished
and the infrastructure lay in ruins.30
Yet despite the lack of human and material capital, the new Rwandan
government announced that it would prosecute all those who participated in
The government immediately embarked upon an
the atrocities.31
aggressive policy of arresting and detaining those suspected of participating
in the genocide, often arresting anyone who appeared to be a genocidaire.32
The numbers of those arrested steadily increased over the ensuing years,
rising from around 10,000 detainees in 1994 to 130,000 by 1998, at a rate of
one thousand to three thousand per month.33
25. See Peter H. Sennett & Gregory P. Noone, Working With Rwanda Toward the
Domestic Prosecution of Genocide Crimes, 12 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 425, 430
(1997); see also Phil Clark, Hybridity, Holism, and “Traditional” Justice: The Case of the
Gacaca Courts in Post-Genocide Rwanda, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 765, 766 & n.5
(2007) (“Most writers estimate the number of Tutsi deaths during the genocide to be in the
range of 500,000 to 1,000,000.”). For a detailed account of the Rwandan genocide, see
PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE KILLED WITH
OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM RWANDA (1998).
26. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1246.
27. See Mark A. Drumbl, Rule of Law Amid Lawlessness: Counseling the Accused in
Rwanda’s Domestic Genocide Trials, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 545, 565 (1998);
Madeline H. Morris, The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda, 7 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT’L L. 349, 352–53 (1997).
28. See Paul J. Magnarella, Expanding the Frontiers of Humanitarian Law: The
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, 9 FLA. J. INT’L L. 421, 435 (1994).
29. Carroll, supra note 1, at 172.
30. See L. Danielle Tully, Note, Human Rights Compliance and the Gacaca
Jurisdictions in Rwanda, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 385, 385 (2003).
31. See id. at 389.
32. See Drumbl, supra note 27, at 565–66.
33. Tully, supra note 30, at 389; see also Carroll, supra note 1, at 189–90; Raper, supra
note 7, at 28.
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At the outset, it was apparent to the GOR that it did not have the physical
capacity to try the accused for genocide.34 Therefore, the government
asked the United Nations Security Council, of which Rwanda was a
member at the time, to convene an international tribunal to adjudicate cases
related to the 1994 genocide.35 The Security Council responded by passing
Resolution 955, thereby establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda.36 The Council listed six motivating factors and purposes in the
resolution: 1) concern that genocide and other “systematic, widespread, and
flagrant violations of international humanitarian law” were committed in
Rwanda; 2) concern that the situation constituted a “threat to international
peace and security;” 3) to put a stop to such atrocities and punish the
perpetrators; 4) to use the prosecutions to facilitate the “process of national
reconciliation and to the restoration and maintenance of peace;” 5) that the
prosecutions will aid in halting violations and provide redress; and 6) to
strengthen the courts in Rwanda, especially regarding the volume of
suspects.37
Although the motivating factors for the resolution largely dealt with
Rwanda’s domestic concerns—in fact, only the second point, “threat to
international peace and security,” constitutes the legal basis for international
intervention under a Chapter VII U.N. Security Council action38—the
Rwandan government very quickly disagreed with elements of the resultant
Tribunal’s form and function.39 Specifically, Rwanda protested 1) the
Tribunal’s limited temporal jurisdiction, 2) its rather limited personnel and
resources, 3) its lack of prioritization of cases to be tried, 4) the
participation of countries complicit in the genocide in the formation of the
Tribunal, 5) that those convicted will be imprisoned outside of Rwanda, 6)

34. In fact, in the first five years after the genocide, Rwandan courts heard 3700 of over
125,000 cases—around three percent of all prisoners. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1287–88.
35. See S.C. Res. 955, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (“[The Security
Council] [d]ecides hereby, having received the request of the Government of Rwanda . . . to
establish an international tribunal . . . .”); Carroll, supra note 1, at 175; Todd Howland &
William Calathes, The U.N.’s International Criminal Tribunal, Is It Justice or Jingoism for
Rwanda? A Call for Transformation, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 135, 141 (1998); Marong et al.,
supra note 24, at 165; Madeline H. Morris, Justice in the Wake of Genocide: The Case of
Rwanda, 3 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 689, 690 (1997).
36. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 35, ¶¶ 1–8.
37. Id. preambular paras. Scholars have noted that the motivating factors of the
individual member States of the Security Council for forming the ICTR were far from
unanimous. For instance, Russia emphasized retributory punishment, France the hope that
public prosecutions would contribute towards establishing peace, the United Kingdom,
Spain, and others the hope that justice would contribute towards reconciliation, while the
Czech Republic disagreed, noting that reconciliation is far too complex. See Howland &
Calathes, supra note 35, at 143–44. For an exhaustive presentation of the member States’
motivating factors, see U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.3453 (Nov. 8,
1994) [hereinafter 955 Meeting].
38. U.N. Charter art. 39 (“The Security Council shall determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations . . . to maintain or restore international peace and security.”).
39. See 955 Meeting, supra note 37, at 14–16.
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the prohibition of the use of the death penalty, and 7) that the Tribunal’s
seat would be located outside of Rwanda.40
Regarding the first point, the GOR was concerned that the Tribunal’s
temporal jurisdiction, limited to the year of 1994,41 would exclude those
who took steps in planning and preparing the genocide prior to that time
from prosecution and thus not serve to “eradicat[e] the culture of impunity
or creat[e] a climate conducive to national reconciliation.”42 Some
members of the Rwandan delegation were convinced that the Security
Council negotiations and the resulting resolution were just a “fig-leaf-afterthe-fact” to hide the international community’s apathy during the genocide
and an attempt to set a precedent, together with the ICTY, toward
establishing an international criminal court.43 Rwanda’s delegate to the
Security Council at the time echoed this concern, stating that “the
establishment of so ineffective an international tribunal would only appease
the conscience of the international community rather than respond to the
expectations of the Rwandese people and the victims of genocide.”44 In
turn, Rwanda voted against the resolution—the only Security Council
member to do so.45 Nevertheless, after the vote the Rwandan government
agreed to cooperate with the Tribunal and has supported it, to varying
This tenuous relationship between the Rwandan
degrees, since.46
government and the ICTR never fully dissipated and is evident throughout
the subsequent jurisdictional conflict and in the current controversy over
whether to transfer cases from the ICTR to the national Rwandan courts.
This conflict over the Tribunal’s transfer mechanism can only be
understood in the context of the ICTR’s primary concurrent jurisdiction in
relation to national jurisdictions, as outlined in the following section.
2. The ICTR and Primary Concurrent Jurisdiction
The establishment of the ICTR marked the first time the principles of
primacy and concurrent jurisdiction—as well as virtually any other
principle of international law—were applied to a conflict that was not
40. See id. Eventually, points one, two, six, and seven became the real points of
contention between the ICTR and the Rwandan government. See Erika R. George, After
Atrocity Examples from Africa: The Right to Education and the Role of Law in Restoration,
Recovery, and Accountability, 5 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 59, 71 (2007); Morris, supra
note 27, at 353–57.
41. See infra Part I.A.2.
42. 955 Meeting, supra note 37, at 14–15. Professor Madeline Morris suggests that the
temporal mandate may not be as limiting as the Rwandan delegate to the Security Council
feared, when considered together with the Tribunal’s subject matter jurisdiction, if “aiding
and abetting prior to 1994 of crimes that were completed in 1994” is ruled to be within the
Tribunal’s mandate. Morris, supra note 27, at 354.
43. Morris, supra note 27, at 357.
44. 955 Meeting, supra note 37, at 15.
45. See id. at 15–16.
46. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 1, at 180–81 (noting that, despite Rwanda’s “tenuous”
relationship with the ICTR, Rwanda’s Government (GOR) “believed it was in Rwanda’s
best interest” to cooperate with the Tribunal). For an example of the Tribunal’s strained
relationship with the GOR, see supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.

1280

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

international in nature.47 Previous international tribunals, such as the
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals after World War II and the ICTY, were
convened in the aftermath of conflicts that were of clear international
character.48 While this may have been a significant departure from most
international humanitarian law doctrine,49 international actors circumvented
this legal obstacle by framing the conflict in international terms,
characterizing the scale of the atrocities as a threat to international
stability.50 Moreover, Rwanda, the country whose sovereignty was at issue,
supported the departure from established doctrine when it specifically
requested that the international community assist in prosecuting genocide
offenders, given the condition of its own shattered judiciary.51
Thus sidestepping this academic debate regarding applying international
law to a domestic conflict, the international community—acting under the
aegis of the U.N. Security Council—invested the ICTR with primary
concurrent jurisdiction. Rather than exclusive, the ICTR exercises
concurrent jurisdiction because it shares subject matter, temporal, and
territorial jurisdiction with any other state that exercises jurisdictional
claims over Genocide cases.52 Yet it also exercises primacy in that it may
compel states with competing jurisdictional claims to transfer a case to the
Tribunal.53 This primary concurrent jurisdiction is at the root of the transfer
debate between Rwanda and the ICTR.
a. Concurrent Jurisdiction
The ICTR’s concurrent jurisdiction with national courts, particularly
Rwanda’s, created a situation where multiple courts could claim jurisdiction
over a particular case. Concurrent jurisdiction “describes any situation
where two or more national courts or at least one national court and an
international court have legal authority to adjudicate the same issue.”54 The
Statute of the ICTR55 makes it clear that the Tribunal and domestic courts,
including those of Rwanda, share jurisdiction over genocide cases. Article
8(1) of the Statute states that “[t]he International Tribunal for Rwanda and
national courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction to prosecute persons for
serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the
territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens for such violations committed in

47. See Magnarella, supra note 28, at 431.
48. See id. Though technically military tribunals, the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals
are generally viewed as marking the beginning of the age of the international ad hoc tribunal
system. See GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 40–64; George, supra note 40, at 61.
49. See Magnarella, supra note 28, at 431 (“[T]he ICTR represents an important
extension of international humanitarian law to internal conflicts.”).
50. See 955 Meeting, supra note 37, at 3–4, 6–7.
51. See supra Part I.A.1.
52. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 162–63.
53. See Morris, supra note 27, at 365.
54. Marong et al., supra note 24, at 162.
55. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M.
1602 [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
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the territory of neighboring States.”56 This is an explicit recognition that
cases relating to the 1994 Genocide and falling within the stated territorial,
temporal, and subject matter jurisdiction can be heard in either domestic
courts or at the Tribunal.
Specifically, Security Council Resolution 955 empowers the Tribunal to
“prosecut[e] persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations
of International Humanitarian Law committed in the territory of Rwanda
and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations
committed in the territory of neighboring States, between 1 January 1994
and 31 December 1994.”57 In particular, the ICTR has subject matter
jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and
violations of Article 3 Common to the Geneva Conventions and of
Additional Protocol II, as defined by the ICTR Statute.58 The Tribunal has
territorial jurisdiction over “the territory of Rwanda including its land
surface and airspace as well as to the territory of neighboring States”59 and
temporal jurisdiction covering the “period beginning on 1 January 1994 and
ending on 31 December 1994.”60 The ICTR’s jurisdiction is thereby clearly
delineated.
However, Rwanda’s own jurisdiction over cases relating to the 1994
Genocide is not in dispute. After all,
Rwanda can establish jurisdiction over those indicted by the ICTR under
the territoriality principle (almost all of the crimes occurred on Rwandan
soil), the nationality principle (the crimes were committed by Rwandans,
and . . . all of the suspects whose cases may be transferred to Rwanda are
Rwandan), and the passive personality principle (the victims were
Rwandan).61

Other states may also try to claim jurisdiction over international war crimes
and crimes against humanity under theories of universal jurisdiction.62 Yet
since Rwanda has traditional jurisdictional claims over those cases
committed in its territory, by its own people, and against its own people, the
government does not need to resort to such sweeping international legal

56. Id. art. 8(1).
57. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 35, ¶ 1.
58. ICTR Statute, supra note 55, arts. 2–4.
59. Id. art. 7.
60. Id.
61. Marong et al., supra note 24, at 187; see also Brown, supra note 5, at 391–92
(discussing the traditional sources of national jurisdiction over international crimes).
62. Generally, universal jurisdiction is the legal principle that recognizes the right “of all
states to prosecute those believed to be responsible for certain special crimes of concern to
the entire international community,” which “[t]oday . . . applies to the serious violations of
international humanitarian law.” Brown, supra note 5, at 392. Some states have invoked this
principle to initiate their own proceedings against perpetrators of crimes occurring in
Rwanda in 1994. Judge Andrew Merelles of Spain has issued indictments against highranking Rwandan officials on charges of committing atrocities on the side of the RPF and
Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) between 1990 and 2002 on the basis of universal
jurisdiction. See generally The Spanish Indictment of High-Ranking Rwandan Officials, 6 J.
INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1003 (2008).
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principles.63 Since Rwanda and the ICTR then explicitly share jurisdiction
over the same crimes, it was inevitable that they at times would both seek
jurisdiction over the same case.64
The question then, is how to determine which court—foreign, Rwandan,
or the Tribunal—should hear a case concerning the 1994 Genocide.65 The
Security Council’s solution to this jurisdictional dilemma is to mandate the
primacy of the international Tribunal over any other court that may assert a
competing claim.
b. The ICTR’s Primacy Over Cases of Concurrent Jurisdiction
The relationship between the ICTR and domestic courts, including those
of Rwanda, is complicated by the fact that the Tribunal is given primacy
over cases falling within its jurisdiction. The principle of primacy
stipulates that the ICTR has superior claims to cases that fall within its
subject matter, temporal, and territorial jurisdiction.66 This means that at
any stage of the proceedings, the ICTR can demand that a national court
transfer a case over which it had previously asserted jurisdiction to the
Tribunal.67 Once the ICTR chooses to hear a case, national jurisdictions are
precluded from pursuing litigation for the same crimes.68 In this manner,
the ICTR preempts national prosecution and prevents the possibility of
double jeopardy.69 Primacy was chosen for two main reasons. First, the
international community wanted to ensure that all genocide cases were to be
dealt with fairly and judiciously.70 The ability to assert primacy over
national jurisdictions enables the Tribunal to cure instances where domestic
courts fail to adequately try perpetrators71 or carry out victor’s justice.72
Second, by creating an international body that has the ability to
authoritatively rule on all cases relating to international criminal law
regarding the Rwandan genocide, the Tribunal can serve to add to the
burgeoning corpus of international humanitarian law.73 This section
discusses, in more detail, the nature of primacy of the ICTR in relation to
other courts and the rationale for its implementation.
63. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 187 (“[W]ithout looking to universal
jurisdiction . . . Rwandan national courts have several independent bases for asserting
jurisdiction over genocide-related crimes.”).
64. See Carroll, supra note 1, at 180; Morris, supra note 27, at 362–63.
65. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 164.
66. See Morris, supra note 27, at 365.
67. See ICTR Statute, supra note 55, art. 28(2)(e).
68. See id. art. 9(1) (“No person shall be tried before a national court for acts
constituting serious violations of international humanitarian law under the present Statute,
for which he or she has already been tried by the International Tribunal for Rwanda.”).
69. See id.
70. See GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 99.
71. See Brown, supra note 5, at 404.
72. See Carroll, supra note 1, at 172–73. For an explanation of victor’s justice, see infra
notes 93–94 and accompanying text.
73. See GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 103; see also Brown, supra note 5, at
408 (asserting that primacy is the only way “to ensure uniformity in the legal process”
(emphasis omitted)).
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The ICTR’s primacy is outlined in its founding documents. Article 8(2)
of the ICTR Statute states that the Tribunal “shall have primacy over the
national courts of all States,” and that “[a]t any stage of the procedure, the
[ICTR] may formally request national courts to defer to its competence.”74
Further, since the ICTR was established via a Chapter VII Security Council
Resolution, all United Nations Member States are bound to comply.75
Resolution 955 makes requisite compliance explicit, stating
all States shall cooperate fully with the International Tribunal . . . in
accordance with the present resolution and the Statute of the [ICTR] and
that consequently all States shall take any measures necessary under their
domestic law to implement the provisions of the present resolution and
the Statute, including . . . orders issued by a Trial Chamber.76

Further clarifying the relationship between the Tribunal and national courts,
Article 28 of the ICTR Statute states that “[s]tates shall cooperate with the
[ICTR] in the investigation and prosecution of persons.”77 Therefore, not
only are states obligated to comply with the Tribunal’s directives
concerning carrying out arrest warrants,78 detaining suspects,79 providing
evidence,80 and the like, states are obligated to transfer any cases falling
within the ICTR’s jurisdiction that the Tribunal may request.81
It is important to note, in this respect, that the nature of the ICTR’s
primacy is not one of traditional judicial review, as is the U.S. Supreme
Court’s primacy over lower courts in the United States.82 Rather, the
ICTR’s primacy is one of first instance,83 in which the Trial Chamber can
request a domestic court to transfer a case, at any stage of the proceedings
74. ICTR Statute, supra note 55, art. 8(2).
75. U.N. Charter art. 25 (“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry
out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”).
76. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 35, ¶ 2.
77. ICTR Statute, supra note 55, art. 28(1). Article 28 continues to enumerate specific
instances of required cooperation, stating:
States shall comply without undue delay with any request for assistance or an
order issued by a Trial Chamber, including but not limited to:
(a) The identification and location of persons;
(b) The taking of testimony and the production of evidence;
(c) The service of documents;
(d) The arrest or detention of persons;
(e) The surrender or the transfer of the accused to the International Tribunal for
Rwanda.
Id. art. 28(2).
78. See ICTR R. P. & EVID. 56 (“The State to which a warrant of arrest or a transfer
order for a witness is transmitted shall act promptly and with all due diligence to ensure
proper and effective execution thereof, in accordance with Article 28 of the Statute.”).
79. See id. 57 (“Upon the arrest of the accused, the State concerned shall detain
him . . . .”).
80. See id. 8 (“[The Prosecutor] may request the State to forward to him all relevant
information in that respect, and the State shall transmit to him such information forthwith in
accordance with Article 28 of the Statute.”).
81. See id. 10(C) (“The State to which the formal request for deferral is addressed shall
comply without undue delay in accordance with Article 28 of the Statute.”).
82. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1315.
83. See id.
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and from any level of court.84 In a specific sense, though, under the
Tribunal’s usage of non bis in idem, the ICTR may also act as a court of last
resort in the instance that the Tribunal finds a national proceeding to be
inadequate.85 While no domestic court may try a suspect for crimes falling
under the ICTR’s jurisdiction “for which he or she has already been tried by
the [ICTR],”86 the ICTR may try someone who was already tried before a
domestic court providing 1) the Tribunal finds that the national court
characterized the crime as “ordinary,” 2) the “domestic proceedings were
not impartial or independent,” 3) the proceedings “shield[ed] the accused
from international criminal responsibility,” or 4) “the case was not
Despite this authority to review national
diligently prosecuted.”87
proceedings, the Tribunal’s main purpose nevertheless is to hear cases in
the first instance.88
Powerful theoretical reasoning buttresses the principle of primacy. First,
there is a “perennial danger” of national courts characterizing international
crimes as “ordinary crimes” and operating to “defeat the very purpose of the
creation of an international criminal jurisdiction, to the benefit of the very
people whom it has been designed to prosecute.”89 Therefore, international
tribunals in general may be inclined to assert their primacy in cases where
“national trials lack credibility in making fair determinations . . . for serious
international crimes,”90 as the ICTR’s non bis in idem exception reinforces.
Second, international tribunals’ primacy may be used to promote and
protect “compelling humanitarian interests in the context of a situation
identified as a threat to international peace and security.”91 Ensuring the
ability of international tribunals to try international crimes against humanity
provides an opportunity to develop international legal precedent and
norms.92
Finally, in the case of Rwanda, the Commission of Experts that made
recommendations to the Security Council before the drafting of Resolution
955 was worried that, “given the scale and brutality of the
crimes . . . committed,” prosecution in Rwanda “would lead to vengeance
84. See ICTR Statute, supra note 55, art. 8(2) (“At any stage of the procedure, the
[ICTR] may formally request national courts to defer to its competence.” (emphasis added));
see also Harhoff, supra note 5, at 574 (“[T]he Tribunal may request national courts to defer
to the competence of the Tribunal at any stage in their procedures.”).
85. See ICTR Statute, supra note 55, art. 9. The doctrine of non bis in idem, commonly
referred to as “the double-jeopardy bar,” generally bars a defendant from being tried more
than once for the same offense. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1150 (9th ed. 2009).
86. Id. art. 9(1); see also supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
87. Id. art. 9(2). This implicitly allows for the Tribunal’s Trial Chambers to hear a case
that was heard on appeal by a national supreme or high court as long as one of the above
conditions is met.
88. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1315.
89. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 58 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct.
2, 1995), available at http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/acdec/en/51002.htm.
90. Brown, supra note 5, at 407.
91. Id.
92. See GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 103; see also Brown, supra note 5, at
408.
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and ‘victor’s justice.’”93 Victor’s justice is generally defined as a postconflict judicial process in which “the victors exercis[e] judicial revenge on
the vanquished.”94 In such a situation, primacy may be necessary to ensure
that justice is carried out fairly and without bias.95
The above justifications for primacy deal with situations in which, in the
interests of justice, the ICTR must compel domestic jurisdictions to defer to
its authority. The issue is complicated, however, when the discussion turns
to whether to transfer a case from the ICTR to a national jurisdiction such
as Rwanda, rather than to compel a case transfer from a national jurisdiction
to the Tribunal.96 In fact, jurisdictional conflict and related concerns over
sovereignty, which came to the fore during ICTR and ICTY proceedings,
influenced the similar yet distinctly different system of complementarity
that forms the basis of the International Criminal Court’s (ICC) jurisdiction.
The next section briefly explores complementarity as practiced by the ICC,
the continued relevancy of debates regarding other theories of jurisdiction
in light of the ICC, and how Rule 11bis, in effect, has the capability of
transforming the primacy of the ICTR to a modified system governed by
complementarity.
c. Complementarity, the International Criminal Court, and the Future of
Ad Hoc Tribunals
The creation and operation of the Rwandan and Yugoslav ad hoc
tribunals contributed significantly to the subsequent formation of a
permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) and the form that it took.97
Aside from learning from their successes, the drafters of the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute)98 were aware of some of
the difficulties the ICTs encountered, including issues concerning primary
concurrent jurisdiction and sovereignty, particularly Rwanda’s tension with
the ICTR.99 Guided by these concerns, the drafters invested the ICC with
93. Carroll, supra note 1, at 172; see also Marong et al., supra note 24, at 186 (there
exists “the possibility . . . in the case of Rwanda, that authorities will mete out victor’s
justice”).
94. GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 64; see also Carroll, supra note 1, at 172;
Marong et al., supra note 24, at 186; Morris, supra note 27, at 371.
95. See Carroll, supra note 1, at 172–73; see also Marong et al., supra note 24, at 186.
96. Professor Morris describes concurrent jurisdiction as “stratified,” which, in her view,
can lead to “anomalies of inversion,” in which an inverse disparity is created wherein the
leaders of the genocide, tried at the ICTR, receive more protections and softer punishments
than lesser criminals tried locally in Rwanda. Madeline H. Morris, Rwandan Justice and the
International Criminal Court, 5 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 351, 354 (1999); Morris, supra
note 27, at 371–72. For a more detailed discussion of possible negative effects of primacy
and how it influences the transfer discussion, see infra Part II.B.1.a.
97. See GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 110; Brown, supra note 5, at 416–30;
Morris, supra note 27, at 362–73. See generally Morris, supra note 96; Evo Popoff, Note,
Inconsistency and Impunity in International Human Rights Law: Can the International
Criminal Court Solve the Problems Raised by the Rwanda and Augusto Pinochet Cases, 33
GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 363 (2001).
98. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 1002
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. The Rome Statute is the ICC’s founding document.
99. See Morris, supra note 96, at 355.
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complementary jurisdiction instead of primacy, in which the Court may
only hear a case if domestic courts normally exercising jurisdiction prove
unwilling or unable to do so.100 Despite the ICC’s mission of becoming a
permanent international court, further exploration of the ad hoc system’s
transfer requirements is necessary largely because: 1) the courts conduct
similar analyses of when it may be necessary to invoke transfer; 2) the ICC
most likely will not preclude the formation of other ad hoc or hybrid
international courts; and 3) a workable transfer regime may allow the ICTR
to more readily reach its 2013 deadline.
The ICTs’ application of their transfer requirements, though markedly
different than those of the ICC, may prove useful in the ICC’s future
interpretation of its own transfer requirements. Like the primacy of the
ICTs, complementarity is a subset of concurrent jurisdiction. However, in
contrast with the ICTs, the ICC cannot compel a domestic court to transfer
a case to the court unless it determines that the domestic court is “unwilling
or unable to act.”101 The “unwilling or unable” requirement, however, does
invoke an analysis similar to that of an ICT transfer decision—the domestic
judicial system may have collapsed or become overwhelmed (and is thus
“unable” to try perpetrators) or may choose to prosecute either to suppress
dissidents, mete out victor’s justice, or let perpetrators off the hook (and is
thus “unwilling”).102 Even in light of complementary jurisdiction, then, an
exploration of the ICTs’ transfer analysis may continue to prove useful in
the pursuit of determining when the ICC should defer to a domestic
judiciary.103
Moreover, even with the advent of the ICC, there is no consensus that the
ad hoc or hybrid systems have been replaced.104 The hybrid system—thus
far including such courts as the Special Panels for Serious Crimes in East
Timor (SPSC), Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), and the
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)—integrates
aspects of Western judicial systems and traditional judicial methods.105
Both independent international systems can fill gaps where the ICC cannot
exercise subject matter jurisdiction—it may only hear cases concerning
state parties to the Rome Treaty that arose after July 1, 2002 and relate to
genocide, crimes against humanity, serious war crimes, and crimes of
100. See GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 113; Morris, supra note 96, at 355.
101. See Morris, supra note 96, at 356.
102. See id. at 356–58.
103. Cf. id. (extrapolating from the ICTR experience situations when the ICC should
confer with domestic courts).
104. See GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 115–30; Higonnet, supra note 4, at 348–
49; Zachary D. Kaufman, Book Review, 10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 209, 212 (2007)
(reviewing Steven D. Roper & Lilian A. Barria, DESIGNING CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS:
SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL CONCERNS IN THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
(2006)). See generally James Cockayne, The Fraying Shoestring: Rethinking Hybrid War
Crimes Tribunals, 28 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 616 (2005) (discussing the future of the hybrid
system); Sonja B. Starr, Rethinking “Effective Remedies”: Remedial Deterrence in
International Courts, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (2008).
105. See generally David Cohen, “Hybrid” Justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, and
Cambodia: “Lessons Learned” and Prospects for the Future, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2007).
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aggression.106 For example, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon was
convened in 2007 for the sole specific purpose of investigating the
assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri.107 In any
event, it is not hard to imagine a scenario where an international court will
once again face the question of when to begin to defer to a national
jurisdiction that exercises traditional sovereign jurisdiction over the
trials.108 Ad hoc tribunals may thus be necessary in situations involving
crimes or incidents that do not fit the ICC’s limited temporal and subject
matter jurisdiction.
Finally, as the ICTs have extended their mandate, now until 2013,109
a workable transfer system may enable the tribunals to meet this new
deadline. In fact, Professor William Burke-White illustrates that the
transfer system, as applied at the ICTY, has enabled the Tribunal to begin to
relieve its caseload.110 He asserts that as applied by the Yugoslav Tribunal,
the monitoring and revocation mechanisms included in 11bis have in fact
transformed the ICTY’s jurisdiction from primary to modified
complimentary, in which the Tribunal will continue to transfer cases to the
Bosnian courts unless the domestic courts, subsequent to transfer, prove
themselves to be unwilling or unable.111 This has not, however, been the
practice with respect to Rwanda. Rather, the Rwanda Tribunal has
continued to apply a strict reading of the 11bis transfer requirements, thus
denying transfers to the Rwandan courts.112 Therefore, the implementation
of a similar workable ICTR transfer regime may likewise ease the
Tribunal’s docket.
The preceding section detailed the ICTR’s jurisdictional relationship with
domestic courts, how such primary concurrent jurisdiction has created
conflicts between the Tribunal and Rwandan courts, and how the resolution
of this conflict may impact the future of both the specific operations of the
ICTR and broad operations of the international system. The next sections
detail the ICTR’s transfer requirements, Rwanda’s legislative attempts to
meet those requirements, and the Tribunal’s application of the transfer
requirements with respect to Rwanda and Europe. A proper understanding

106. See Rome Statute, supra note 98, arts. 5, 11, 12.
107. See GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 124–34.
108. See Amelia S. Canter, Note, “For These Reasons, The Chamber: Denies the
Prosecutor’s Request for Referral”: The False Hope of Rule 11 Bis, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
1614, 1656 (2009).
109. See ICTR/UN—ICTR Appeals Chamber to Continue Work Until Mid-2013,
HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY (June 12, 2009), http://www.hirondellenews.com/
content/view/12483/179/.
110. See William W. Burke-White, The Domestic Influence of International Criminal
Tribunals: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Creation
of the State Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 279, 328–35
(2008) (describing how the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
(ICTY) used the 11bis transfer mechanism specifically to help fulfill its Completion
Strategy).
111. See id. at 319–28. For an explanation of the Tribunal’s monitoring and revocation
mechanisms, see infra notes 148–49 and accompanying text.
112. See infra Part I.B.3.c.
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of the Tribunal’s transfer requirements, Rwanda’s responses, and the
ICTR’s application of the rule to the Rwandan context is necessary to
evaluate whether transfer is appropriate and justified.
B. The ICTR’s Transfer Regime: Sending a Case from the Tribunal to a
National Jurisdiction
The United Nations Security Council has laid out the guidelines for a
broad transfer policy to help facilitate the ICTR’s completion of its mandate
by 2010.113 Security Council Resolution 1534 calls upon the ICTR to
implement a completion strategy in order to “complete all work in 2010,”
which can in part be achieved by transferring cases to “competent national
jurisdictions.”114 Resolution 1534 draws upon Resolution 1503, which
specifically urges the ICTR to “formalize a detailed strategy . . . to transfer
cases involving intermediate and lower-rank accused to competent national
jurisdictions, as appropriate, including Rwanda.”115 Consistent with this
directive, the ICTR Prosecutor, in his June 4, 2009 statement to the Security
Council, acknowledged that “[s]uccessful completion of the Tribunal’s
mandate . . . depends on a large extent on the ability of the Tribunal to
transfer the cases of nine (9) of the fugitives and some of the detained
indictees for trial within Rwanda and other national jurisdictions.”116 To
date, the ICTR Prosecutor has successfully transferred fifty-five nonindicted suspects to Rwanda and one to Belgium,117 in accordance with the
discretionary latitude the Prosecutor is given when dealing with nonindicted suspects.118 However, the Trial Chamber has approved transfer of
only two indicted suspects, both to France.119 Otherwise, all other attempts

113. At the time of this writing, the Appeals Chamber has extended the deadline to mid2013 at the earliest. See supra note 109.
114. S.C. Res. 1534, supra note 15, ¶¶ 3–4.
115. S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 14 (emphasis added).
116. Hassan B. Jallow, Statement of the Prosecutor of the ICTR to the U.N. Security
Council (June 4, 2009) (transcript available at http://www.unictr.org/tabid/
155/Default.aspx?id=1029).
117. See Hassan B. Jallow, Statement of the Prosecutor of the ICTR to the U.N. Security
Council (June 18, 2010) (transcript available at http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/
Default.aspx?id=1144) (bringing the total number of cases transferred up to fifty-five); THE
ISSUES AT STAKE IN THE CLOSURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (ICTY) AND RWANDA (ICTR) 6 (2009) [hereinafter ISSUES AT STAKE],
available at www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/NoteTPI521ANG2009.pdf; Marong et al., supra note
24, at 160; Møse, supra note 8, at 672.
118. See The President of the ICTR, Completion Strategy of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, ¶ 39, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/358 (June 1,
2006) [hereinafter ICTR Completion Strategy, June 2006] (“[T]he decision to transfer cases
to national jurisdictions is a judicial one in cases where indictments exist . . . .”); Møse,
supra note 8, at 672 (“Such transfers [of non-indicted suspects] depend on prosecutorial
discretion and are administrative in nature, based on cooperation between the ICTR
Prosecutor and national prosecuting authorities.”).
119. See Prosecutor v. Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR-2005-87-I, Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Request for the Referral of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka’s Indictment to France
(Nov. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Munyeshyaka, Transfer Decision]; Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta,
Case No. ICTR-2005-85-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of Laurent
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to transfer indicted defendants to national jurisdictions, including Rwanda,
have failed.120 The reason for this discrepancy between the success of nonindicted referrals and the failure of indicted referrals is the Tribunal’s strict
application of Rule 11bis’ transfer requirements, which applies solely to
referral requests for indicted suspects.121 Chiefly, as the remainder of this
section illustrates, the Tribunal’s strict interpretation of 11bis’ fair trial
requirement has been an obstacle to transferring cases from the Tribunal to
Rwanda.
1. Requirements for Transfer to a National Jurisdiction Under Rule 11bis
The ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence provide a mechanism
whereby the Tribunal may transfer a case to a national jurisdiction. Rule
11bis stipulates the conditions under which the Tribunal may transfer an
indictment to another court.122 The rule outlines, inter alia, to which
suspects it applies,123 to which states it applies,124 certain judicial and due
process thresholds such states must meet,125 and monitoring126 and
revocation mechanisms.127 In considering transfer requests, the Tribunal
has been mostly concerned with ensuring the defendants’ right to a fair trial
in the transfer country.128
If the Prosecutor wishes to transfer the case of an indicted defendant to a
national jurisdiction, she must submit a request to the President of the
ICTR, who in turn designates a Trial Chamber to conduct a hearing on
whether the transfer is acceptable.129 While an accused cannot be tried in

Bucyibaruta’s Indictment to France (Nov. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Bucyibaruta, Transfer
Decision].
120. See ISSUES AT STAKE, supra note 117, at 7. The Prosecutor submitted five cases to
the Trial Chambers for consideration for transfer to Rwanda; all requests were denied. Three
of those five were subsequently heard and denied on appeal. See id.; see also ICTR
Completion Strategy, May 2009, supra note 16, ¶ 50. Additionally, the ICTR denied the
referral of one case to Norway, subsequently granted referral to the Netherlands, but then
revoked such referral when a Dutch court ruled it did not have jurisdiction over an unrelated
case involving crimes against humanity. See Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR2005-86-11bis, Decision on Prosecution’s Extremely Urgent Motion for Revocation of the
Referral to the Kingdom of the Netherlands Pursuant to Rule 11bis(F) & (G), ¶¶ 11–12
(Aug. 17, 2007) [hereinafter Bagaragaza, Referral Revocation Decision]. See generally
Alhagi Marong, The ICTR Transfers Michel Bagaragaza to the Netherlands for Trial, ASIL
INSIGHTS, (June 18, 2007), http://www.asil.org/insights070618.cfm.
121. See ICTR Completion Strategy, June 2006, supra note 118, ¶ 39; ISSUES AT STAKE,
supra note 117, at 6–7; Møse, supra note 8, at 672–74.
122. ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis. The ICTR’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence were
written pursuant to Article 14 of the ICTR Statute, which calls for the judges of the Tribunal
to adopt such rules. See ICTR Statute, supra note 55, art. 14.
123. See ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis(A).
124. See id. 11bis(A)(i–iii).
125. See id. 11bis(C), (D)(ii).
126. See id. 11bis(D)(iv).
127. See id. 11bis(F).
128. See infra notes 140–47 and accompanying text.
129. See ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis(A), (B). The Trial Chamber may order such a referral
on its own accord as well. See id. 11bis(B).
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absentia,130 the Trial Chamber may conduct a referral hearing if the suspect
is not yet in custody.131 In order for a state to have jurisdiction over a case,
the state must be one “(i) in whose territory the crime was committed; or
(ii) in which the accused was arrested; or (iii) having jurisdiction and being
willing and adequately prepared to accept such a case.”132 If the Trial
Chamber finds that the requested host state satisfies one of the three
jurisdictional requirements, the Chamber must also satisfy itself that “the
accused will receive a fair trial in the courts of the State concerned and that
the death penalty will not be imposed or carried out.”133
A key element in determining the sufficiency of a national jurisdiction
under 11bis is whether the transfer country possesses a legal framework
under which it may try crimes similar to the Tribunal.134 The Appeals
Chamber, in accordance with the view of the Trial Chambers, has read a
general competency requirement into 11bis’s requirements for national
jurisdiction.135 Competency, according to the Tribunal, is a judicial
determination in which a Trial Chamber “must consider whether it has a
legal framework which criminalizes the alleged conduct of the accused and
provides an adequate penalty structure.”136 To satisfy the first prong, the
130. See ICTR Statute, supra note 55, art. 20(4)(d) (“[T]he accused shall be
entitled . . . (d) [t]o be tried in his or her presence, and to defend himself or herself in person
or through legal assistance . . . .”).
131. See ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis(A) (“If an indictment has been confirmed, whether or
not the accused is in the custody of the Tribunal, the President may designate a Trial
Chamber [to] determine whether the case should be referred to the authorities of a State.”
(emphasis added)). Therefore, the Prosecutor may submit referral requests for the nine
fugitives as he proposed, even if they are already indicted. See Jallow, supra note 116; see
also, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta, Case No. ICTR-05-85-I, Designation of a Trial
Chamber for the Referral of the Case to a State, ¶ 3 (July 11, 2007) (granting request to
designate Trial Chamber for a referral hearing even though “the accused is not in the custody
of the Tribunal”).
132. ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis(A)(i–iii).
133. Id. 11bis(C).
134. See infra note 136.
135. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 4 (“Rule
11bis of the Rules allows a designated Trial Chamber to refer a case to a competent national
jurisdiction for trial . . . .”); Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-R11bis,
Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal Against Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis, ¶ 4
(Oct. 30, 2008) [hereinafter Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision] (same);
Munyakazi, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 4 (same).
136. Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 4;
Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 4; Munyakazi, Appeals
Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 4. Courts apply the same general competency
test to analyze whether states have jurisdiction and are “adequately prepared” for the
purposes of Rule 11bis(A)(iii). See Bucyibaruta, Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶ 8 (“In
determining whether or not a State has jurisdiction within the meaning of Rule 11bis . . . the
Chamber must consider whether such a State has a legal framework which criminalizes the
alleged conduct of the accused and provides an adequate sentencing structure.”);
Munyeshyaka, Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶ 8 (“In assessing whether or not a State
has jurisdiction within the meaning of Rule 11bis, the Chamber must consider whether such
a State has a legal framework which criminalizes the alleged conduct of the accused and
provides an adequate sentencing structure.”); Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR2005-86-11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of the Indictment to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands, ¶¶ 9–12 (Apr. 13, 2007) [hereinafter Bagaragaza, Trial
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Tribunal must find that the state has criminalized the alleged conduct as an
international crime listed in the Statute and not as a mere “ordinary”
crime.137 International crimes codified by the transfer state need not be
identical to those listed in the ICTR, but rather “similar in substance.”138
To satisfy the second prong, “[t]he penalty structure within the State must
provide an appropriate punishment for the offences for which the accused is
charged, and conditions of detention must accord with internationally
recognized standards.”139
If the Tribunal is satisfied that the transfer state meets the competency
requirement, it then “shall satisfy itself that the accused will receive a fair
trial.”140 In so doing, the Tribunal considers “whether the accused will be
accorded the rights set out in Article 20 of the Tribunal’s Statute.”141
Article 20 of the ICTR Statute lists the defendants’ rights, such as the right
of the presumption of innocence, to be tried without undue delay, to be tried
in one’s own presence, the right to an attorney and, if the defendant is
indigent, to be provided one free of charge, and the right to examine and
cross examine witnesses for the prosecution and defense under the same
conditions.142 Through the application of Article 20(2) of the ICTR
Chamber’s Transfer Decision] (conducting the same competency test to determine whether
the Netherlands has jurisdiction and is adequately prepared to try to the case).
137. See Bucyibaruta, Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶ 8 (“A case can be referred to
the national courts of a State only where the State concerned will charge and convict the
persons responsible for those international crimes listed in the Statute as opposed to ordinary
law crimes.”); Bagaragaza, Trial Chamber’s Transfer Decision, supra note 136, ¶ 11 (“The
Tribunal only has authority to refer cases where the State ‘will charge and convict [or acquit]
only for those international crimes listed in its Statute’ as opposed to ‘ordinary crimes’ such
as homicide.” (quoting Prosecutor v. Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-05-86-AR11bis, Decision
on Rule 11bis Appeal (AC), ¶ 16 (Aug. 30, 2006) (alteration in original)); see also
Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 6–12 (analyzing
whether Rwandan law adequately criminalizes the charged crimes in accordance with Rule
11bis).
138. Gatete, Transfer Decision, supra note 8, ¶ 21 (finding Rwandan law sufficiently
similar to the Statute’s definition of criminal responsibility).
139. Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 4 (citing
Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 4); Kanyarukiga,
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 4 (citing Munyakazi, Appeals
Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 4); Munyakazi, Appeals Chamber Transfer
Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 4 (citing Prosecutor v. Radovan Stankovic, Case No. IT-96-23/2PT, Decision on Referral of Case under Rule 11bis, ¶ 32 (May 17, 2005)).
140. ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis(C); see also Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer
Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 4 (“The Trial Chamber must also consider whether the accused
will receive a fair trial . . . .”); Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note
135, ¶ 4; Munyakazi, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 4.
141. Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 4 (“The Trial
Chamber must also consider whether the accused will receive a fair trial . . . .”);
Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 4; Munyakazi, Appeals
Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 4.
142. ICTR Statute, supra note 55, art. 20. In its entirety, Article 20 provides for the
equality of all persons before the Tribunal; the right to a fair and public hearing; the
presumption of innocence; the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the charges;
adequate time and access to facilities to prepare a defense; the right to communicate with an
attorney of one’s own choosing; the right to be tried without undue delay; the right to be
tried in one’s own presence; the right to representation of an attorney, to be informed of this
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Statute,143 which invokes Article 21’s protection of witnesses,144 as well as
Article 20’s equal access to witnesses provision,145 the Tribunal also
requires the transfer state to provide an effective witness protection
program.146 Lastly, Rule 11bis(C) specifies that “the death penalty will not
be imposed or carried out” in the transfer state.147
Rule 11bis also provides for certain safeguards to help ensure the
administration of justice and states’ compliance with due process
proceedings. Specifically, Rule 11bis(D)(iv) provides that “the Prosecutor
may send observers to monitor the proceedings in the courts of the State
concerned,”148 while 11bis(F) provides that the ICTR, at the request of the
Prosecutor, may revoke the transfer order at any time before the state court
reaches a verdict.149 While the Tribunal recognizes the benefit of these
safeguards, it has held that they alone may not be sufficient to overcome a
defect in a state’s ability to provide an enumerated due process right, such
as witness protection, especially since the decision to send monitors and
request revocation lies within the discretion of the Prosecutor.150 In sum,
then, the Tribunal has interpreted and applied 11bis to mean that a transfer
country must have a legal framework which criminalizes the conduct of the
accused, must not impose the death penalty, and must guarantee that
defendants will receive a fair trial by ensuring each of the defendants’ rights
stipulated in the ICTR Statute. Barring the satisfaction of any of the
requirements—despite the monitoring and revocation mechanisms—the
right, and, if indigent, to be provided with one free of charge; the right to examine and cross
examine witnesses for the prosecution and defense under equal conditions; the provision of
an interpreter free of charge; and the right not to testify against oneself or be compelled to
confess guilt. See id.
143. Id. art. 20(2) (“[T]he accused shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing, subject to
Article 21 of the Statute.”).
144. Id. art. 21 (“The [ICTR] shall provide . . . for the protection of victims and
witnesses.”).
145. Id. art. 20(4)(e).
146. See, e.g., Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 40
(denying referral motion in part because of lack of adequate protection of and access to
witnesses); Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 35
(dismissing the prosecution’s grounds for appeal based on inadequate witness protection);
Munyakazi, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 45 (dismissing the
prosecution’s grounds for appeal based on inadequate witness protection).
147. ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis(C).
148. Id. 11bis(D)(iv).
149. Id. 11bis(F).
150. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 29
(holding that the Trial Chamber’s error in failing to consider certain monitoring mechanisms
was inconsequential, as “these procedures and remedies would not necessarily solve the
current problems related to the availability and protection of witnesses” and that monitoring
and revocation “lie within the sole discretion of the Prosecution”); Kanyarukiga, Appeals
Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 38 (“[T]hese procedures and remedies would
not necessarily solve the current problems related to the availability and protection of
witnesses [and] the decision to send monitors and the right to request . . . revocation lie
within the sole discretion of the Prosecution.”); Gatete, Transfer Decision, supra note 8, ¶ 94
(holding that although the monitoring system in place “has led to the rejection of some of the
objections against transfer . . . monitoring will not . . . solve the problems relating to
availability and protection of witnesses”).
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Tribunal will not transfer a case to a national jurisdiction.151 This next
section discusses Rwanda’s attempts at legislating to meet the ICTR’s high
standard under 11bis.
2. Rwanda’s Legislative Responses to 11bis Requirements
The government of Rwanda implemented Organic Law No. 11/2007
(Transfer Law) as part of a continuous effort to align Rwandan law dealing
with transfer cases from the ICTR with the ICTR Statute itself in order to
facilitate the successful transfer of cases from the ICTR to Rwandan
courts.152 The Transfer Law created a dual system in Rwanda, in which
certain legal provisions, procedures, and guarantees apply specifically to
cases transferred from the ICTR or other states to Rwanda but not to cases
that originate in the domestic system.153 Contrary to genocide cases that
originate in Rwandan courts,154 those that are transferred from the ICTR are
heard exclusively by the High Court in the first instance155 and by the
Supreme Court on appeal.156 Similarly, in the event that the Transfer Law
may conflict with any other law, the provisions within the Transfer Law
prevail.157
Since the enactment of the Transfer Law, the GOR has continuously
written and updated legislation in response to the ICTR’s denial of
referrals.158 The preambular paragraphs to the Transfer Law itself state that
the Parliament adopted the law “[c]onsidering [the] Statute of the [ICTR]
and its Rules of Procedure and Evidence [and] [c]onsidering . . . particularly
the requirements to transfer cases from the ICTR to national jurisdictions,

151. See infra Part I.B.3.c.
152. See Law No. 11/2007 of Mar. 16, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda,
Mar. 19, 2007, Preamble.
153. See id. art. 24.
154. The 2004 Gacaca Law categorizes genocide crimes into three categories. See Law
No. 16/2004 of June 19, 2004, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, June 19, 2004,
art. 51, modified and complemented by Law No. 13/2008 of 19/05/2008, available at
http://www.amategeko.net/display_rubrique.php?ActDo=all&Information_ID=1262&
Parent_ID=30692916&type=public&Langue_ID=An&rubID=30692917. All cases except
those involving people who planned and organized the genocide or those who held
significant leadership positions and participated in or encouraged others to participate in the
genocide (the first two subsections of the first category) are heard in the gacaca courts. See
id. arts. 2, 51. Those aforementioned exceptions are heard by ordinary or military courts.
See id. art. 2.
155. See Law No. 11/2007 of Mar. 16, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda,
Mar. 19, 2007, art. 2.
156. See id. art. 16.
157. See id. art. 25.
158. See, e.g., Security Council Meeting 6134, supra note 10, at 31. Rwandan Prosecutor
General Martin Ngoga addressed the Council, saying,
[d]espite [2008’s] disappointing decision by the Trial and Appeals Chambers to
reject the Prosecutor’s request to transfer cases to Rwanda . . . we have undertaken
a review and proposed amendments to the law governing the transfer of cases and
the law abolishing the death penalty, and we have established a witness protection
unit within the judiciary.
Id.
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including Rwanda.”159 As a result, the Transfer Law and its progeny
include expansive due process protections and severe limitations on the
application of the death penalty (resulting in its eventual abolishment) in
order to accord with the ICTR’s 11bis transfer requirements.
a. The Transfer Law’s Due Process Protections
The Transfer Law provides for extensive due process protections for
defendants, in tandem with the ICTR Statute and Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. Article 13 enumerates the rights of the accused in a virtually
identical manner to those listed in Article 20 of the ICTR Statute.160 Some
have argued that Rwanda already guaranteed these rights through its
ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul
Charter)161 together with Rwanda’s Constitutional provision making
international treaties “more binding than organic laws and ordinary
laws.”162 Regardless of such prior obligations, Rwanda’s implementation
of the Transfer Law makes such obligations explicit.163 Additionally,
Article 14 of the Transfer Law guarantees that the GOR shall provide
“appropriate protection for witnesses and shall have the power to order
protective measures similar to those set forth in Articles . . . of the ICTR
Rules of Procedure and Evidence.”164 Further, Article 14 guarantees the
government’s facilitation of witnesses living abroad and confers upon them
“immunity from search, seizure, arrest or detention during their testimony
and during their travel to and from the trials,” along with the provision that
the High Court may establish additional protections it deems necessary to
159. Law No. 11/2007 of Mar. 16, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda,
Mar. 19, 2007, Preamble.
160. Compare Law No. 11/2007 of Mar. 16, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of
Rwanda, Mar. 19, 2007, art. 13, with ICTR Statute, supra note 55, art. 20.
161. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 190–91; Tully, supra note 30, at 403–04.
Article 14 of the ICCPR includes a virtually identical list of rights, see International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 14, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, at 176–77
[hereinafter ICCPR], as does Article 7 of the Banjul Charter. See African Charter on Human
and Peoples’ Rights art. 7, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58, at 60 [hereinafter Banjul Charter].
Rwanda ratified the ICCPR on April 16, 1975 and the Banjul Charter on July 15, 1983. See
Gatete, Transfer Decision, supra note 8, ¶ 27 n.44.
162. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF RWANDA OF 04 JUNE 2003 art. 190.
Rwanda’s Constitution also enumerates certain due process guarantees. See id. arts. 16, 18–
20; see also Marong supra note 24, at 191.
163. See Gatete, Transfer Decision, supra note 8, ¶¶ 27–32.
164. Law No. 11/2007 of Mar. 16, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda,
Mar. 19, 2007, art. 14. Specifically, the Transfer Law guarantees those measures mentioned
in rules 53, 69, and 75 of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence. See id. Those
measures include the non-disclosure of any materials, information, or the identity of
witnesses or victims in the interests of justice. See ICTR R. P. & EVID. 53, 69, 75.
Additionally, in 2009, ICTR staff began training the Rwandan Witness Protection Service as
well as establishing a video link system for allowing long distance testimony, which “should
take care of the concerns related to witness protection and provide an alternative for the
taking of evidence of witnesses who may be reluctant to travel to Rwanda.” Hassan B.
Jallow, Statement of the Prosecutor of the ICTR to the U.N. Security Council (Dec. 3, 2009)
(transcript available at http://www.unictr.org/tabid/155/Default.aspx?id=1035).
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guarantee their safety.165 The Transfer Law also provides specific
protections for the defendants’ attorneys, ensuring the right to travel within
Rwanda unencumbered and to be free from search, seizure, and arrest, as
well as the right to security at their own request.166 Last, in accordance
with Rule 11bis, the Transfer Law provides for the possibility of the
presence of ICTR monitors during the domestic trial process and recognizes
the Tribunal’s right to revoke the transfer.167 Thus, the Transfer Law
addresses the main procedural and due process mechanisms that are present
in the ICTR Statute and Rules. The Transfer Law similarly addresses the
ICTR’s concerns regarding the application of the death penalty in Rwandan
courts.
b. From the Death Penalty to Life Imprisonment
Prior to 2007, the fact that Rwanda still practiced the death penalty was
the major obstacle preventing the consideration of the transfer of cases from
the ICTR to Rwanda’s national courts.168 As noted above, according to
ICTR Rule 11bis(C), “the Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself . . . that the
death penalty will not be imposed or carried out.”169 Given the fact that
one of Rwanda’s major objections to the formation of the ICTR was the
Tribunal’s prohibition of the death penalty,170 its dissonance with Rule
11bis(C)’s provisions is clear. As a result, while Rwanda maintained the
death penalty—even during its years of disuse171—the ICTR would not
seek transfer due in large part to the country’s legal allowance of capital
punishment.172
Rwanda’s difficulty in meeting 11bis requirements is evident in the
ICTR’s refusal to recognize Rwanda’s subsequent abolition of the death
penalty as sufficient to cure Rwanda’s 11bis deficiency with respect to
capital punishment. In July 2007, the Rwandan parliament passed Organic
Law No. 31/2007 (Death Penalty Abolition Law), thereby abolishing the
165. Law No. 11/2007 of Mar. 16, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda,
Mar. 19, 2007, art. 14.
166. See id. art. 15.
167. See id. arts. 19, 20 (establishing that the ICTR Prosecutor has “the right to designate
individuals to observe the progress of cases transferred to Rwanda in accordance with article
11bis D) iv) of the ICTR Rules” and recognizing that “[i]n the event the ICTR revokes [a
transfer order] pursuant to Rule 11bis . . . the accused shall be promptly surrendered to the
ICTR”).
168. See The President of the ICTR, Completion Strategy of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, ¶ 36, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2006/951 (Dec. 8,
2006) [hereinafter ICTR Completion Strategy, Dec. 2006] (“Transfer of cases to Rwanda
raises several issues. One involves the death penalty, which is applicable in genocide cases,
though only rarely implemented.”); cf. Marong et al., supra note 24, at 201 (“[R]eferrals to
Rwandan authorities would not be appropriate unless the Rwandan government addresses
problems relating to fair trials through legal reforms and official abstention from the use of
the death penalty.”).
169. ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis(C); see also supra note 133 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
171. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 195 (noting that there have been no executions
for genocide-related crimes in Rwanda since 1998).
172. See ICTR Completion Strategy, Dec. 2006, supra note 168, art. 36.
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death penalty.173 After its passage, many thought that this law would
enable the ICTR Prosecutor to successfully request referrals to Rwanda.174
Additionally, the Transfer Law, passed just four months earlier, stipulates
that “life imprisonment shall be the heaviest penalty imposed upon a
convicted person in a case transferred to Rwanda from ICTR,” effectively
abolishing the death penalty for ICTR transfer cases.175 Encouraged by the
Rwandan legislation, the ICTR Prosecutor submitted three requests for
referral to Rwanda shortly after the passage of the Death Penalty Abolition
Law,176 soon followed by two others.177
However, the Tribunal has since repeatedly held that the provisions in the
Death Penalty Abolition Law, though sufficient to ensure against the
imposition of the death penalty, have in fact created another problem: the
Law allows for the possibility of the imposition of the penalty of prolonged
life imprisonment in isolation for transfer cases.178 Though not enumerated
in Rule 11bis or the ICTR Statute, the Tribunal held that prolonged
imprisonment in isolation may be in violation of a defendant’s rights and
therefore would not sanction transfers to Rwanda.179 And while the
Tribunal recognized that prolonged detention in isolation has not been
definitively recognized as a violation of a human right,180 it ruled that the
possibility of such imposition, arising from an ambiguity in the law, is
sufficient to deny transfer.181 This ambiguity arises from the question of
whether the Death Penalty Abolition Law or the Transfer Law is

173. See Law No. 31/2007 of July 25, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda,
July 25, 2007, available at http://www.amategeko.net/display_rubrique.php?
Information_ID=2088&Parent_ID=30698444&type=public&Langue_ID=An#a30698445.
174. See, e.g., The President of the ICTR, Report on the Completion Strategy of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ¶ 35, delivered to the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/2007/676 (Nov. 20, 2007) [hereinafter ICTR Completion Strategy, Nov. 2007 (“Since
the recent abolition of the death penalty in Rwanda . . . the Prosecutor has filed three
requests in terms of Rule 11bis for the referral to Rwanda for trial of the cases of three of the
accused . . . . The requests are pending judicial determination.”); ICTR/Transfer—The
Transfer Policy of the ICTR Prosecutor Takes Another Hit, HIRONDELLE NEWS AGENCY
(Aug. 24, 2007), http://hirondellenews.com/content/view/9825/340/ (“The only
option . . . for these countries that refuse to try persons accused of genocide would be to
extradite them to Rwanda, which is henceforth possible due to its new law that abolishes the
death penalty.”).
175. See Law No. 11/2007 of Mar. 16, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda,
Mar. 19, 2007, art. 21.
176. See ICTR Completion Strategy, Nov. 2007, supra note 174, ¶ 35.
177. See The President of the ICTR, Report on the Completion Strategy of the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, ¶ 50, delivered to the Security Council, U.N.
Doc. S/2008/322 (May 13, 2008) [hereinafter ICTR Completion Strategy, May 2008] (noting
the number of transfer requests pending at five).
178. See, e.g., Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 31–
38; Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶¶ 6–17; Munyakazi,
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶¶ 8–21.
179. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 38.
180. See Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-R11bis, Decision on
Prosecutor’s Request for the Referral of the Case of Ildephonse Hategekimana to Rwanda, ¶
25 (June 19, 2008) [hereinafter Hategekimana, Trial Chamber’s Transfer Decision].
181. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 38.
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controlling.182 The issue in contention is whether the Death Penalty
Abolition Law’s provision for “life imprisonment with special provisions”
may apply to transfer cases,183 or whether the maximum penalty of life
imprisonment as provided in the Transfer Law applies.184 The Tribunal
held the ambiguity lies in whether the Transfer Law, as the law directly on
point (lex specialis), overrides the possibly contradicting Death Penalty
Abolition Law provision, or whether the latter overrides the former as it is
later in time, under the principle lex posterior derogate priori.185 Since the
Tribunal was unable to determine which law is controlling, it erred on the
side of caution and concluded that it was unable to ensure that “life
imprisonment with special provisions” will not be applied by the Rwandan
courts, and therefore, in large part, denied the referral requests.186
Once again responding to the ICTR’s latest decisions denying referrals to
Rwanda, largely on the basis of the above ambiguity regarding life
imprisonment, the Rwandan parliament amended the Death Penalty
Abolition Act to exclude the possibility of life imprisonment with special
provisions from cases transferred from the ICTR.187 The Appeals Chamber
in Prosecutor v. Hategekimana188 noted that, had the amendment entered
into force, “the ambiguity as to the applicable punishment for transfer
cases . . . would be resolved.”189 The Tribunal continued, however, that
since “there is no information . . . to indicate that this law has entered into
182. See id. ¶ 38 (“The Appeals Chamber is therefore unable to conclude that the
ambiguity [between the Death Penalty Abolition and Transfer Laws] as to the applicable
punishment under Rwandan law for transfer cases has been resolved.”); see also
Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 16; Munyakazi,
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 20.
183. See Law No. 31/2007 of July 25, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda,
July 25, 2007, art. 4, available at http://www.amategeko.net/display_rubrique.php?
Information_ID=2088&Parent_ID=30698444&type=public&Langue_ID=An#a30698445.
Specifically, “life imprisonment with special provisions” provides that “1) a convicted
person is not entitled to any kind of mercy, conditional release or rehabilitation, unless
he/she has served at least twenty (20) years of imprisonment; 2) a convicted person is kept in
isolation.” Id. Article 5 lists the crimes that are subject to this penalty, which include, inter
alia, “crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity.” Id. art. 5.
184. See, e.g., Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 31–
38; Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶¶ 6–17; Munyakazi,
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶¶ 8–21.
185. See, e.g., Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 31–
38; Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶¶ 6–17; Munyakazi,
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶¶ 8–21.
186. See, e.g., Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 38;
Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 16; Munyakazi,
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 20.
187. See Law No. 31/2007 of July 25, 2007, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda,
July 25, 2007, art. 3, modified and complemented by Law No. 66/2008 of 21/11/2008,
Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, Dec. 1, 2008, available at
http://www.amategeko.net/display_rubrique.php?Information_ID=2088&Parent_ID=306984
44&type=public&Langue_ID=An#a30698445. The law reads: “[L]ife imprisonment with
special provisions . . . shall not be pronounced in respect of cases transferred to Rwanda
from the [ICTR] and from other States . . . .” Id. art. 3.
188. Case No. ICTR-00-55B-R11bis, Decision on the Prosecution’s Appeal Against
Decision on Referral Under Rule 11bis (Dec. 4, 2008).
189. Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 38.
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force,” the ambiguity remains.190 This strongly suggests that if referrals are
brought to the Appeals Chamber in the future, this ground of denial will be
reversed, though not necessarily the others pertaining to fair trial due
process protections.
As seen below, when deciding whether to refer cases to Rwanda, the
Tribunal undertakes a factual analysis to determine whether Rwandan law is
implemented in practice, in contrast with both the Appeals Chamber’s
decisions in transferring cases to other countries than Rwanda as well as its
decisions concerning transfer cases at the ICTY. Part I.C.3 contrasts the
Appeals Chamber’s narrow, strictly legal approach to ICTY and ICTR
transfer requests to Europe with the Chamber’s broad interpretation and
application of 11bis requirements when evaluating referrals to Rwanda,
considering both factual allegations concerning the situation within the
country in addition to its existing laws.
3. 11bis in Practice: Transferring Cases to Europe and Rwanda
a. The ICTY’s Application of 11bis in Transferring Cases to Bosnia and
Herzegovina
Given the similarities between the ICTY’s and ICTR’s form and
function,191 it is useful to briefly examine the ICTY’s application of its
transfer requirements, particularly with respect to its successful decisions to
transfer cases to Bosnia and Herzegovina.192 As the subsequent sections
illustrate, the ICTY conducts a purely legal analysis of domestic law to
ensure that such law comports with 11bis requirements, whereas the ICTR
Appeals Chamber applies both a legal analysis and a factual review of many
factors, despite defendants’ similar due process concerns in both courts.193
The comparison between the two Tribunals’ transfer requirements is
particularly apt because both the ICTY and ICTR share an Appeals
Chamber194 and, importantly, the ICTR’s Rule 11bis was taken virtually
verbatim from the Yugoslav Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure and
Evidence.195 Further, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1503 urges the
ICTR to model its completion strategy on that of the ICTY, specifically in
190. Id.
191. See infra notes 194–95 and accompanying text.
192. See infra note 197 and accompanying text.
193. See infra notes 198–208 and accompanying text.
194. See ICTR Statute, supra note 55, art. 13(4) (“The members of the Appeals Chamber
of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia shall also serve as the members of
the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for Rwanda.”).
195. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1231 & n.27 (“[T]he international legal community
responded to atrocity in Rwanda simply by using as boilerplate the Statute of the ICTY . . .
.”). Compare ICTR R. P. & EVID. 11bis, with ICTY R. P. & EVID. 11bis. Most relevant to
this discussion, ICTY’s Rule 11bis provides that the designated Trial Chamber may refer an
indictment to a state “(i) in whose territory the crime was committed; or (ii) in which the
accused was arrested; or (iii) having jurisdiction and being willing and adequately prepared
to accept such a case.” ICTY R. P. & EVID 11bis(A). The Rules also provide that the Trial
Chamber must be “satisfied that the accused will receive a fair trial and that the death
penalty will not be imposed or carried out.” Id. 11bis(B).
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facilitating the transfer of cases to national jurisdictions.196 Contrary to the
ICTR, however, the ICTY has, on numerous occasions, referred cases under
Rule 11bis to Bosnia and Herzegovina—the country where the defendants
were accused to have committed atrocities.197 Given the similarities
between the 11bis requirements and the existence of a shared Appeals
Chamber, it is useful to compare how the Appeals Chamber applied Rule
11bis to ICTY cases with how the same court applied a virtually identical
rule to ICTR transfer cases.
The ICTY has been primarily concerned with ensuring that the laws of
the transfer state comport with the requirements of Rule 11bis and has
refrained from conducting a factual analysis of trial and prison conditions in
practice.198 In so doing, the Appeals Chamber has satisfied itself that the
laws of Bosnia and Herzegovina guarantee a fair trial, including, the right to
a fair and public hearing, adequate time to prepare a defense, right to
counsel, and equal access to witnesses.199 For example, in Prosecutor v.
Rasevic & Todovic, the Appeals Chamber held that the Referral Bench did
not have an obligation to investigate whether access to witnesses was in fact
guaranteed in practice in Bosnia, but merely to ensure that the law provided
for such protections.200 The ICTY has similarly found defendants’ fears of
196. See S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 14, preambular paras. (“The Security
Council . . . urg[es] the ICTR to formalize a detailed strategy, modelled [sic] on the ICTY
Completion Strategy, to transfer cases . . . to competent national jurisdictions . . . .”)
(emphasis omitted).
197. See President of the ICTY, Assessment and Report, ¶ 44, delivered to the Security
Council, U.N. Doc. S/2009/252 (May 18, 2009) [hereinafter ICTY Report, May 2009]
(noting that from 2005 to 2007, eight cases involving thirteen accused were transferred to
national jurisdictions, ten to Bosnia, two to Croatia, and one to Serbia); see also ISSUES AT
STAKE, supra note 117, at 6.
198. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Rasevic & Todovic, Case Nos. IT-97-25/1-AR11bis.1 & IT97-25/1-AR11bis.2, Decision on Savo Todovic’s Appeals Against Decisions on Referral
Under Rule 11bis, ¶ 56 (Sept. 4, 2006) [hereinafter Rasevic & Todovic, Appeals Chamber
Transfer Decision] (“The Referral Bench correctly considered whether it was satisfied that
the Appellant would receive a fair trial by establishing that the legislation . . . allows for
adequate time and facilities for the preparation of a defence. That is all it was required to do
pursuant to Rule 11bis of the Rules.”); Prosecutor v. Jankovic, Case No. IT-96-23/2AR11bis.2, Decision on Rule 11bis Referral, ¶¶ 44–57 (Nov. 15, 2005) [hereinafter
Jankovic,
Appeals
Chamber
Transfer
Decision],
available
at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stankovic/acdec/en/051115.htm (holding that the Trial
Chamber’s analysis of the applicable Bosnian law is sufficient to guarantee a fair trial);
Prosecutor v. Stankovic, Case No. IT-96-23/2-AR11bis.1, Decision on Rule 11bis Referral,
¶¶ 18–30 (Sept. 1, 2005) [hereinafter Stankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision],
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/stankovic/acdec/en/050901.htm
(dismissing
defendant’s
contentions that he would not receive a fair trial in Bosnia in actuality, finding the Trial
Chamber’s analysis of the applicable law sufficient); see also Marong et al., supra note 24,
at 182, 185.
199. See, e.g., Rasevic & Todovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198,
¶¶ 49–84; Jankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶¶ 41–62;
Stankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶¶ 18–30; Marong et al.,
supra note 24, at 181–85.
200. See Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶ 63 (“The Referral Bench
was only required to ascertain whether the provisions concerning the measures which may
be ordered by the State Court of [Bosnia and Herzegovina] for the protection of witnesses,
do not unfairly impinge upon the Appellant’s right to a fair trial.”).
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receiving victor’s justice in Bosnian courts201 to be without merit,
emphasizing the professional role of judges in the courtroom.202
Additionally, the Appeals Chamber has repeatedly held that Rule 11bis’
monitoring and revocation provisions in part guarantee the defendants’ right
to a fair trial in the transfer country, when considered with the Tribunal’s
other findings regarding fair trial protections.203 While defendants have
repeatedly made allegations that Bosnia’s laws are not implemented in
practice,204 that they would risk receiving victor’s justice,205 and that
monitoring and revocation are insufficient safeguards due to the fact that
only the Prosecutor can recommend monitoring and revocation,206 the
Tribunal has only thus far implemented a strict procedural application of the
11bis ICTY transfer rule.207 This is in stark contrast to the Appeals
Chamber’s review of ICTR transfer requests, wherein, as detailed below in
Part I.B.3.c, the Chamber has conducted a factual review of many factors,
particularly the availability of witness protection, and questioned the
sufficiency of monitoring and revocation mechanisms regardless of the
adequacy of the Rwandan laws in place.208
The ICTY Appeals Chamber appears chiefly concerned with the
existence of enumerated due process protections in law and not the practical
application of such laws. This may be due to the ICTY’s involvement with
the courts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As part of the ICTY’s completion

201. See, e.g., Jankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶ 42
(“[T]he Appellant submits that the Referral Bench failed to properly inform itself . . . (vi)
about the existence of potential prejudice towards the Appellant if his case is referred to the
authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”).
202. See id. ¶ 53 (“The Appellant has not demonstrated that such statements would cause
prejudice towards his right to a fair trial, as the judges at the [Bosnia and Herzegovina] State
Court are professional . . . judges.”).
203. See Rasevic & Todovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶¶ 82–
84 (finding that the Referral Bench did not err in “satisf[ying] itself that the appellants would
receive a fair trial in part on the basis of Rule 11bis(D)(iv) monitoring and the Rule 11bis(F)
revocation mechanisms”); Jankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198,
¶¶ 55–57; Stankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶ 52 (“The
Appellant is . . . wrong to suggest that it was improper for the Referral Bench to have
satisfied itself that the Appellant would receive a fair trial in part on the basis [of the]
monitoring and the . . . revocation mechanism.”).
204. See Rasevic & Todovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶ 50
(“[T]he Appellant argues that the Referral Bench focused on whether there was a legal
framework in place, instead of assessing whether such a framework was in fact
implemented.”); Jankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶ 42 (“The
Appellant argues that the legal structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina in itself is insufficient to
guarantee a fair trial and that further inquiry into the implementation of the necessary
standards was required.”); Stankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198,
¶ 19 (“[The defendant] notes that the Referral Bench was satisfied that there are legal
instruments in place that could result in a fair trial, but that finding, he asserts, is not enough:
those legal instruments must actually be shown to be in use.”).
205. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
206. See Rasevic & Todovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶ 80;
Jankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶ 42.
207. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 181–85.
208. See infra notes 243–46 and accompanying text.
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strategy,209 the Tribunal has assisted Bosnia and Herzegovina in setting up
a special court to hear cases related to genocide and war crimes.210 This
court is comprised of both international and Bosnian judges, a fact upon
which the Tribunal places much importance.211 Professor Burke-White
emphasizes the role that the monitoring and revocation mechanisms play in
ensuring fair trials in the Bosnian context.212 The threat of revocation, he
argues, “encourage[s] national courts to meet a relatively high standard of
justice.”213 In this view, the threat of revocation, then, is a sufficient stick
to the carrot of transfer to incentivize domestic judges to comport with
international fair trial standards.214 Thus, the ICTY is confident in
transferring cases to the Bosnian state courts, despite concerns that there
still remains a question over whether an adequate defense is possible at
all.215 Therefore, it may well be that the international community is aware
of whether Bosnian due process laws are enforced216 or, if inequities result,
that the ICTY is able to confidently recall the case to The Hague.217
The above discussion presents a concise analysis of ICTY 11bis rulings,
focused on those issues relevant to the Rwandan context. The preceding
issues—mainly the Tribunal’s analysis regarding fair trial provisions and
monitoring mechanisms—are the most directly analogous to and distinct
from the Appeals Chamber’s concerns regarding transferring cases to
Rwanda under the ICTR’s Rule 11bis.218 With respect to transfer
applications, the ICTY Appeals Chamber has also ruled on defendants’
challenges to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction,219 the adequacy of national courts
to hear genocide and war crimes cases,220 and disputes over which national
court has a “greater nexus” to grant jurisdiction,221 among other related
209. See President of the ICTY, Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution
of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, ¶ 6, delivered to the
Security Council and General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/57/379-S/2002/985 (Sept. 4, 2002)
[hereinafter ICTY Report, Sept. 2002]; see also MICHAEL BOHLANDER, THE TRANSFER OF
CASES FROM INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS TO NATIONAL COURTS 2–21 (2004),
available
at
http://liveunictr.altmansolutions.com/Portals/0/English\News\events\
Nov2004\Bohlander.pdf.
210. See BOHLANDER, supra note 209, at 2–21; GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at
105.
211. See, e.g., Jankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶ 53 (“The
Appellant has not demonstrated that such statements would cause prejudice towards his right
to a fair trial, as the judges at the [Bosnia and Herzegovina] State Court are professional—
and partly international—judges.” (emphasis added)).
212. See Burke-White, supra note 110, at 322–29.
213. Id. at 325.
214. See id.
215. See id. at 346.
216. Cf. BOHLANDER, supra note 209, at 8 (noting that international judges would only be
necessary until standards “consistent with those expected by the international and national
community” were developed).
217. See Burke-White, supra note 110, at 322–29.
218. See infra Part I.B.3.c.
219. See, e.g., Stankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶¶ 10–17.
220. See, e.g., Jankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶¶ 19–27.
221. See Rasevic & Todovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶¶ 32–
48; Jankovic, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 198, ¶¶ 28–40.
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issues. Yet while the ICTY’s application of 11bis transfer requirements is
distinct from the ICTR’s application of the Rule to referrals to Rwanda, its
approach is similar to the Rwanda Tribunal’s application of the transfer rule
to non-Rwandan venues. The next section describes the ICTR’s similar
concern with 11bis’ legal requirements, absent factual determinations, when
considering transfer requests to non-Rwandan venues.
b. The ICTR’s Application of 11bis in Transferring Cases to Non-Rwandan
Venues
The ICTR has, on a few occasions, considered referral requests to nonRwandan jurisdictions and has therefore had to conduct and apply an
analysis of 11bis requirements accordingly. The ICTR has thus far granted
two referral requests to France222 and one to the Netherlands,223 though the
latter request was revoked after a Dutch court ruled that the Netherlands
does not exercise jurisdiction over certain international crimes.224 While, in
these cases, the ICTR Trial Chambers have been primarily concerned with
ensuring that the French and Dutch courts have personal and subject matter
jurisdiction over cases relating to the Rwandan genocide225—a concern not
as relevant in referral requests to Rwanda due to its unquestioned
jurisdiction under traditional notions of national jurisdiction226—the
decisions also deal with some of the due process issues that have arisen in
both the ICTY and Rwanda transfer cases.227
Similar to the Appeals Chamber’s rulings in ICTY transfer cases, the
ICTR Trial Chambers is primarily concerned with the adequacy of
European law guaranteeing fair trial and monitoring provisions and the nonimposition of the death penalty and thus refrains from conducting a factual
analysis of whether such laws are enforced.228 For example, in evaluating
whether the defendant will receive a fair trial in France, the Tribunal in
Prosecutor v. Bucyibaruta229 determined that France’s ratification of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and ICCPR as
222. See generally Munyeshyaka, Transfer Decision, supra note 119; Bucyibaruta,
Transfer Decision, supra note 119.
223. See generally Bagaragaza, Trial Chamber’s Transfer Decision, supra note 136.
224. See Bagaragaza, Referral Revocation Decision, supra note 120, ¶¶ 11–12 (granting
the Prosecutor’s request for revocation of the transfer order after finding that Dutch courts
ruled that they do not have jurisdiction to hear cases relating to the genocide and war
crimes).
225. See Munyeshyaka, Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 5–17; Bucyibaruta,
Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 5–17; Bagaragaza, Trial Chamber’s Transfer
Decision, supra note 136, ¶¶ 8–30.
226. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
227. See Munyeshyaka, Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 18–30; Bucyibaruta,
Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 18–30; Bagaragaza, Trial Chamber’s Transfer
Decision, supra note 136, ¶¶ 31–39.
228. See Munyeshyaka, Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 18–30; Bucyibaruta,
Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 18–30; Bagaragaza, Trial Chamber’s Transfer
Decision, supra note 136, ¶¶ 31–39.
229. Case No. ICTR-2005-85-I, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral of Laurent
Bucyibaruta’s Indictment to France (Nov. 20, 2007).
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well as its own domestic law suffice to guarantee such rights without
conducting a factual analysis of its application.230 Similarly, the Tribunal
has held, without explaining its reasoning, that France’s and the
Netherlands’ attestations that equal access to witnesses and trial monitoring
is guaranteed under law and in practice are sufficient for the purposes of
11bis.231 The Tribunal’s willingness to accept Western European countries’
due process guarantees may be explained by the international community’s
general acceptance of the existence of such protections in Western
democracies.
Nevertheless, the Tribunal does not offer this general acceptance nor its
familiarity with Western legal systems as reason for its disinclination from
conducting a factual review.232 Rather, much like the Appeals Chamber’s
ICTY 11bis rulings, the ICTR seems to view a factual analysis in these
cases not only unnecessary but beyond its purview.233 This solely laworiented method is inapposite to the ICTR’s treatment of 11bis
determinations concerning transfers to Rwanda. As the next section
illustrates, when determining whether to transfer a case to Rwanda, the
ICTR is willing to investigate not only applicable (and possibly sufficient)
Rwandan law but also context-specific situations inside the country and,
based on those factual findings, deny transfer.
c. The ICTR’s Application of 11bis in Transferring Cases to Rwanda
Compared to the ICTY’s application of 11bis to transferring cases to
Bosnia and Herzegovina and the ICTR’s application of 11bis to France and
the Netherlands, the Rwanda Tribunal treats the transfer question as a
mixed question of law and fact when considering whether to transfer a case
to Rwanda. Under this approach, the Tribunal applies a strict analysis of
both Rwandan law and practice to evaluate whether Rwanda’s judicial
system meets Rule 11bis’ strict requirements.234 Though noting the
progress of Rwanda’s judicial system and the (general) sufficiency of its
230. See Bucyibaruta, Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 21–24.
231. See Munyeshyaka, Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 18–30; Bucyibaruta,
Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 18–30; Bagaragaza, Trial Chamber’s Transfer
Decision, supra note 136, ¶¶ 31–39.
232. See Munyeshyaka, Transfer Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 20–30 (conducting an
analysis only of French law pertaining to fair trial, witness protection, and monitoring
mechanisms without mentioning any factual application of such law); Bucyibaruta, Transfer
Decision, supra note 119, ¶¶ 20–30 (same); Bagaragaza, Trial Chamber’s Transfer
Decision, supra note 136, ¶¶ 31–39 (conducting an analysis only of Dutch law pertaining to
fair trial, witness protection, and monitoring mechanisms).
233. See supra note 232.
234. See, e.g., Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 14–
30 (discussing the conditions in Rwanda pertaining to witness availability and monitoring
mechanisms despite laws providing for such protections); Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber
Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 35 (“[I]f the case were to be transferred to Rwanda, [the
defendant] might face difficulties in obtaining witnesses residing within Rwanda because
they would be afraid to testify . . . .”); Munyakazi, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision,
supra note 10, ¶ 47 (holding that the Trial Chamber did not err in considering the conditions
in Rwanda after considering the applicable Rwandan law).
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laws, the Tribunal has denied transfer to Rwanda due to factual
determinations of the situation within Rwanda itself.235 Most recently, the
Appeals Chamber held that, under 11bis, transfer to Rwanda is
unacceptable because of the ambiguity in the Transfer Law relating to life
imprisonment236 and the inability to guarantee defendants’ access to
Assuming
witnesses residing both within and outside Rwanda.237
Rwanda’s amended Transfer Law meets the Tribunal’s standards,238 the
remaining factor preventing transfer to Rwanda is the apparent lack of
effective witness protection.
In order to evaluate the conditions within Rwanda, the ICTR has
accepted amicus briefs from Human Rights Watch,239 the Kigali Bar
Association,240 and the government of Rwanda,241 among others. Drawing
upon the Trial Chambers’ findings from the reports, the Appeals Chamber
considers whether the political and security situation in Rwanda creates the
atmosphere intended by the 11bis legal requirements.242 In such a manner,
the Appeals Chamber has repeatedly upheld the Trial Chambers’ findings
that although Rwandan law provides for witness protection,243 the evidence
suggests that witnesses living both within Rwanda and residing abroad may

235. See infra notes 239–46 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 173–89 and accompanying text.
237. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 39–40
(“[T]he Appeals Chamber has dismissed Ground 3 of the Appeal on the basis that it is unable
to conclude that the penalty structure in Rwanda will be adequate . . . . [T]he Trial Chamber
did not err in concluding that [the defendant’s] right to obtain the attendance of, and to
examine, Defence witnesses . . . cannot be guaranteed at this time in Rwanda.”); Munyakazi,
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 50 (The Appeals Chamber “has
dismissed the remaining grounds of appeal, which relate to fundamental matters concerning
whether [the defendant’s] right to obtain the attendance of, and to examine, Defence
witnesses under the same conditions as [the Prosecution’s] witnesses, can be guaranteed . . .
and whether the penalty structure in Rwanda is adequate”).
238. See supra notes 173–89 and accompanying text.
239. See generally Prosecutor v. Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-1997-36-I, Decision on the
Request by Human Rights Watch for Leave to Appear as Amicus Curiae (Mar. 10, 2008);
Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-I, Decision on Defence Request to
Grant Amicus Curiae Status to Four Non-Governmental Organisations (Feb. 22, 2008)
(granting status to Human Rights Watch while denying others).
240. See generally Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-I, Decision on
Amicus Curiae Request by The Kigali Bar Association (Feb. 22, 2008); Prosecutor v.
Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-1997-36-I, Decision on the Application by the Kigali Bar
Association for Leave to Appear as Amicus Curiae (Dec. 6, 2007).
241. See generally Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, Case No. ICTR-00-55B-I, Decision on
Request by the Republic of Rwanda, The Kigali Bar Association, The ICDAA, and ADAD
for Leave to Appear and Make Submissions as Amici Curiae (Dec. 4, 2007) (granting status
to Rwanda, reserving determination on others); Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR2002-78-I, Decision on the Request of the Republic of Rwanda for Leave to Appear as
Amicus Curiae (Nov. 9, 2007).
242. See, e.g., Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 21
(noting that the Trial Chamber had sufficient information from the amicus briefs to
determine that defense witnesses experienced harassment in Rwanda).
243. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 23;
Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 27; Munyakazi,
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 38.
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fear testifying in Rwanda.244 Further, the Appeals Chamber has held that
although monitoring and revocation mechanisms exist, and while Rwanda
maintains video-link technology to set up distance testimony for witnesses
reluctant to travel to Rwanda, such mechanisms are insufficient to
guarantee the principle of equality of arms between the prosecution and
defense.245 In other words, even with such protective mechanisms, the
totality of the circumstances does not remedy the lack of adequate witness
protection.246 Therefore, the Tribunal concludes, although the Rwandan
legal system guarantees, in law and in effect, all other 11bis due process
requirements, its deficiencies in both penalty structure and witness
protection preclude case transfer to Rwandan national courts.247 In contrast
with the ICTs’ reluctance to make factual determinations regarding the
implementation of domestic law when considering transfer to non-Rwandan
venues, the ICTR has found the failure of adequate implementation of
Rwandan law as reason to deny transfer to Rwanda.
The above part demonstrates the historical and political background of
the formation and composition of the ICTR, as well as the legal
requirements and hurdles required to transfer a case from the Tribunal to a
court of national jurisdiction, in particular to Rwanda. With respect to legal
structure, Rwanda has continuously revised its legal code in order to meet
the demands of the Tribunal. Most significantly, Rwanda enacted the 2007
Transfer Law and 2008 amendment to the Death Penalty Abolition Law
with the hopes of meeting the ICTR’s Rule 11bis requirements. However,
to date no cases have been referred to Rwanda, due largely to the ICTR’s
findings that Rwanda cannot in fact provide adequate witness protection,
despite laws guaranteeing such protections. The following part outlines the
arguments for and against such transfer to Rwanda in particular, with
specific emphasis on respect for procedural due process on the one side and
competing conceptions of retributive and rehabilitative justice on the other.

244. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 22, 26;
Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 26, 31.
245. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 26–30;
Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶¶ 33–39; Munyakazi,
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶¶ 42–49. The Tribunal has
acknowledged that the Prosecutor’s suggested monitor—the African Commission on Human
and People’s Rights (African Commission)—is qualified to monitor domestic proceedings,
but that monitoring nevertheless is insufficient to cure the witness protection deficiency. See
Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 29; Kanyarukiga,
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶¶ 37–38.
246. See Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 34;
Munyakazi, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 43; Gatete, Transfer
Decision, supra note 8, ¶ 64. The Tribunal has yet to reconsider the matter in light of the
ICTR’s recent witness protection training program and video-link services. See supra note
164.
247. See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
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II. TO TRANSFER OR NOT TO TRANSFER? DUE PROCESS PROTECTION V.
JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION
This part analyzes the legal and policy arguments for and against
transferring cases from an international tribunal to national jurisdictions,
specifically to courts of the country where the greatest nexus of the crimes
committed occurred—in this case, Rwanda. Part II.A focuses on the
position of those who advocate preventing the transfer of cases until certain
specific due process guarantees are met in the transfer country. For the sake
of brevity and due to their emphasis on the importance of guaranteeing the
protection of certain due process requirements prior to granting transfer,
this Note labels these opponents of transfer “Protectionists.”248 While
different “Protectionists” may emphasize different aspects of due process,
they are united in the high degree of importance they attach to due process
requirements and the need to buttress international legal standards. Part
II.B focuses on the position of those who advocate the importance of
transferring cases to the nexus country. These “Foundationalists,” united
by the emphasis they place on the Tribunal’s goals as enumerated in its
foundational documents, primarily argue that crimes of mass atrocity must
be tried in the home country in order to effectuate the trials’ purposes of
societal rehabilitation and retribution, and in so doing recognize the
legitimacy of a non-Western method of carrying out justice.
A. Protectionists: Complete Fulfillment of Fair Trial Protection
Guarantees Before Transfer
Protectionists oppose the transfer of cases from the ICTR to Rwanda
unless complete due process protection, as articulated by the Tribunal’s
interpretation of Rule 11bis, can be guaranteed not only in law but in
practice in Rwanda. The Tribunal itself shares this view and therefore
ICTR transfer decisions help illustrate the position. Aside from sharing a
concern for defendants’ rights, Protectionists also advocate keeping cases at
the Tribunal in order to help establish a consistent set of international legal
norms and incentivize domestic regimes to undertake meaningful legal
reform. Part II.A.1 details the Protectionists’ concern for defendants’ rights
in domestic courts while Part II.A.2 discusses their aspiration for creating a
coherent body of international law and domestic legal reform.
1. The Risk of Victor’s Justice and Concern for the Rights of the Defendant
In cases of mass atrocities and international crimes against humanity,
there is a risk that the home populace will be overeager to convict and
sentence the accused in order to satisfy the wronged-population’s thirst for
revenge and desire to hold someone accountable for the crimes committed

248. It is important to note that neither the opponents nor advocates of transfer comprise a
monolithic school of legal thought. Rather, this Note synthesizes the many arguments for
and against transfer in order to evaluate the arguments in their totality.
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against them249—what some scholars identify as “victor’s justice.”250 This
is an acute concern for those who oppose transfer of cases from the ICTR to
Rwanda.251 To avoid such an outcome, then, due process protections must
be guaranteed to their fullest and vigilantly guarded in the home country to
ensure that the defendant will receive a fair trial.252
Protectionists—largely supported by the Tribunal’s own interpretation of
11bis—advocate that all due process protections must be met in a transfer
country prior to referral.253 Absent a single protection, transfer must be
denied, both for the sake of the defendants’ rights254 and the integrity of the
legal system.255 Opponents of transfer have argued that the language of
11bis empowers the Tribunal to look beyond relevant Rwandan law to
actual practice in Rwanda to determine that transfer is not advisable.256
International attorneys Alhagi Marong, Charles Cherner Jalloh, and David
Kinnecome argue that the ICTR should only transfer cases to Rwanda once
it receives a guarantee from the GOR that a host of due process provisions
will be met,257 despite the existence of domestic laws that already precisely
provide those protections.258 The concern is that the laws themselves are
irrelevant if they are not fully applied.259 To date, and in contrast with the
Appeals Chamber’s position regarding ICTY transfer cases,260 the Chamber
has upheld its right to consider the facts on the ground in determining
whether Rwandan courts will provide a fair trial as they define it.261 In

249. See Carroll, supra note 1, at 172; Morris, supra note 27, at 371. Some delegates to
the Security Council in 1994 were sensitive to the accusations that the Nuremberg and
Tokyo Tribunals meted out “victor’s justice” and therefore wanted to ensure that such
accusations could not be leveled against the new Rwanda Tribunal. See Popoff, supra note
97, at 374–75.
250. See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 1, at 172; Marong et al., supra note 24, at 186; Morris,
supra note 27, at 371.
251. See Carroll, supra note 1, at 172 (“[T]he Commission of Experts . . . worried that
emotionally, politically, and ethnically charged domestic prosecutions would lead to
vengeance and ‘victor’s justice’ rather than fair trials.”); Morris, supra note 27, at 371
(“[D]efendants in national courts will have more reason than defendants tried before an
international tribunal to fear bias, in the form of victor’s justice or of personal partiality.”).
252. See generally Marong et al., supra note 24, at 197–98, 201.
253. See id.
254. See infra notes 269–80 and accompanying text.
255. See infra Part II.A.2.
256. See Gatete, Transfer Decision, supra note 8, ¶ 31 (describing the Defense’s and
Human Rights Watch’s assertions that “there is a gap between judicial theory and practice”
in Rwanda); Hategekimana, Trial Chamber’s Transfer Decision, supra note 180, ¶ 33
(describing the Defense’s and amici curiae’s request “to look beyond the relevant Rwandan
laws and consider Rwanda’s past practices”); Prosecutor v. Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR2002-78-R11bis, Decision on Prosecutor’s Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda,
¶ 31 (June 6, 2008) [hereinafter Kanyarukiga, Trial Chamber’s Transfer Decision].
257. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 198 (“[T]he government must guarantee that all
other fair trial standards will be met . . . .”).
258. See supra Part I.B.2.
259. See Prosecutor v. Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-2001-67-I, Brief of Human Rights
Watch as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Rule 11bis Transfer, ¶¶ 12, 25–111 (Jan. 3, 2008)
[herinafter HRW Brief].
260. See supra Part I.B.3.a.
261. See supra Part I.B.3.c.
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practice, the Tribunal has preferred a Protectionists’ application of 11bis by
reading the Rule’s fair trial provision to require a finding that the transfer
country guarantees a full set of internationally-recognized due process
protections, in law and in practice, for defendants prior to granting
transfer.262
Protectionists urge the Tribunal to read extensive due process
requirements into 11bis, including conducting a factual analysis out of a
serious concern for the rights of the defendant263—a concern that has
dominated the Tribunal’s analysis as well. In so doing, opponents stress
that the alleged bias of the Rwandan judiciary and pressures from the
government would constitute a form of victor’s justice which should
preclude transfer to Rwandan courts.264 Specifically, the defense and
human rights organizations such as Human Rights Watch argue that the
Rwandan courts are dominated by ethnic Tutsis, are each comprised of only
one judge, and are susceptible to biased government pressure.265 While the
Appeals Chamber eventually ruled that the Rwandan judiciary is
sufficiently independent from executive influence and that the specific
number of judges who hear a given case is irrelevant to determining
whether the trial comports with due process standards,266 the Chamber
noted that there is indeed a concern of political sensitivity when dealing
with genocide cases and the judiciary.267 Similarly, the Trial Chambers
have since ruled that although the individual allegations against the
Rwandan judiciary are insufficient to prevent transfer on their own, some of
the concerns are “well-founded,”268 further validating the concerns that the
opponents of transfer and the Tribunal have regarding transferring cases to
Rwanda and the high standards domestic judiciaries must meet.
Similarly, Protectionists tend to evaluate whether Rwanda (or any other
country) meets 11bis requirements by going through the list of due process
protections listed in the ICTR Statute one by one and, if finding any of the
protections lacking, recommend against transfer.269 In practice, the Trial
Chamber adopts this methodology.
The Chamber addresses the
262. See supra notes 140–46 and accompanying text.
263. See HRW Brief, supra note 259, ¶¶ 25–111.
264. See Gatete, Transfer Decision, supra note 8, ¶¶ 33–38; Hategekimana, Trial
Chamber’s Transfer Decision, supra note 180, ¶¶ 39, 42–43; Kanyarukiga, Trial Chamber’s
Transfer Decision, supra note 256, ¶¶ 36–39; see also Marong et al., supra note 24, at 186,
193, 197, 201.
265. See Gatete, Transfer Decision, supra note 8, ¶¶ 33–38; see also Hategekimana, Trial
Chamber’s Transfer Decision, supra note 180, ¶¶ 39, 42–43; Kanyarukiga, Trial Chamber’s
Transfer Decision, supra note 256, ¶¶ 36–39.
266. See Munyakazi, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶¶ 26–31
(overruling the Trial Chamber’s holding that Rwandan courts did not meet standards of
adequate judicial independence and fairness).
267. See id. ¶ 26.
268. See Gatete, Transfer Decision, supra note 8, ¶ 39; Kanyarukiga, Trial Chamber’s
Transfer Decision, supra note 256, ¶ 42; accord Hategekimana, Trial Chamber’s Transfer
Decision, supra note 180, ¶ 46.
269. See generally Marong et al., supra note 24, at 189–95 (analyzing Rwandan legal
practice by evaluating whether it meets certain specific enumerated standards, such as equal
treatment under the law, sufficient pre-trial prison conditions, and witness protection).
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Defendant’s allegations point by point,270 arriving at the conclusion to deny
transfer on the basis that one or two fair trial protections are not enforced,
While some
despite the fulfillment of other requirements.271
protectionists—such as Human Rights Watch—have asserted that transfer
should be denied on the basis that the GOR does not provide numerous due
process protections in practice,272 the Appeals Chamber has found that most
protections are afforded by the GOR.273 Rather, the Appeals Chamber has,
on the three occasions it considered the matter, consistently held against
transfer to Rwanda on the grounds of lack of adequate witness protection
Now that the
and uncertainty over the applicable punishment.274
amendment to the Death Penalty Abolition Law has gone into effect, the
ambiguity over Rwanda’s penalty structure has most likely been
resolved.275 Given the Appeals Chamber’s language in Prosecutor v.
Hategekimana,276 it is likely that the Tribunal would have held that lack of
adequate witness protection itself, absent the ambiguity over the penalty
structure or any other due process deficiency, would have been sufficient to
deny transfer.277 That is to say, in the Tribunal’s Protectionist view, one
270. See, e.g., Gatete, Transfer Decision, supra note 8, ¶¶ 33–87 (addressing each of the
Defendant’s allegations against the Rwandan judicial system: judicial independence,
impartiality, and capacity; presumption of innocence; right to an effective defense;
availability of counsel; legal aid; working conditions; availability and protection of witnesses
both within and outside Rwanda; double jeopardy; arrest and conditions of detention; and
life imprisonment with solitary confinement).
271. See, e.g., id. ¶ 95. After considering many different factors under the due process
rubric, the Trial Chamber held against transfer because there were questions regarding
whether the Defendant would have sufficient access to witnesses in and outside Rwanda, as
well as concern over the then-ambiguity concerning the applicable penalty. See id.
272. See HRW Brief, supra note 259, ¶¶ 14–16.
273. See Munyakazi, Appeals Chambers Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 50 (denying
transfer of the basis of lack of adequate witness protection and penalty structure while
overruling Trial Chamber’s other finding of due process deficiencies).
274. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 39–40
(holding that although the Trial Chamber erred in finding that Rwandan law does not
criminalize command responsibility, that Rwanda does not have mutual assistance
agreements with other countries, and erred in failing to consider the availability of
monitoring and revocation mechanisms, the lack of certain witness protection mechanisms
and the possible ambiguity over Rwanda’s penalty structure were sufficient to uphold the
Trial Chamber’s denial of transfer); Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision,
supra note 135, ¶¶ 16, 27, 35 (affirming the Trial Chamber’s denial of transfer based on
ambiguous penalty structure and questions regarding witness protection); Munyakazi,
Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 50 (holding that despite the Trial
Chamber’s error in holding that the Rwandan judiciary was not independent and impartial,
lack of adequate witness protection and ambiguity over Rwanda’s penalty structure were
sufficient to uphold the Trial Chamber’s denial of transfer).
275. See supra notes 187–89 and accompanying text.
276. See supra notes 189–89 and accompanying text.
277. The Tribunal’s methodology is to consider each ground of appeal separately. In
Prosecutor v. Hategekimana, the Prosecution filed three grounds of appeal: 1) that the Trial
Chamber erred in failing to recognize Rwanda’s criminalization of command responsibility,
2) that the Trial Chamber erred in holding lack of availability and protection of witnesses,
and 3) that the Trial Chamber erred in holding that the applicable penalty in Rwanda is
ambiguous. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 6,
14, 31. The Appeals Chamber granted the Prosecution’s first ground of appeal, but denied
the other two. See id. ¶ 12–13, 30, 38. It therefore is likely that had the Appeals Chamber

1310

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

significant due process deficiency is enough to outweigh other judicial
considerations in determining whether to transfer a case from the ICTR to
Rwanda.278 In fact, a single due process deficiency—assuming allegations
of witness harassment and intimidation are true279—may be enough to
prejudice a trial.280 Some Protectionists even suggest that the mere failure
to complete the 11bis requirements as a procedural checklist, regardless of
which specific protection is lacking, is reason enough to deny transfer.281
The Tribunal is keen to look to the facts in Rwanda in addition to the law
particularly in evaluating witness availability, contrary to its approach in
ICTY cases. Protectionists are mostly concerned that the lack of a
defendant’s ability to access witnesses on his or her behalf to the same
extent as the Prosecution’s witnesses violates the principle of equality of
arms and completely undermines the fairness of the trial.282 The Trial and
Appeals Chambers view access to witnesses as being so integral to due
process that they have held that the mere possibility of the witnesses’ fear to
testify in Rwanda, “regardless of whether their fears are well-founded,” is
enough to determine that defendants will not have sufficient access to
witnesses and that therefore trials will be inherently unfair.283 Aside from
specific, isolated instances of harassment and intimidation—which the
Tribunal notes as reason enough to absolve a witness from alleging specific
instances of harassment pertaining to her case284—Protectionists point to
the criminalization of “genocide ideology,” under which one who expresses
granted two grounds of appeal and denied the one regarding witness protection, that singular
due process deficiency would have still been sufficient to deny transfer to Rwanda.
278. This is in line with the Tribunal’s language of recognizing the progress that the
Rwanda judiciary has made over the years while maintaining that the witness protection
deficiency casts doubt over the ability to conduct fair trials. See, e.g, Gatete, Transfer
Decision, supra note 8, ¶ 95 (“The [Trial] Chamber concludes that the Republic of Rwanda
has made notable progress in improving its judicial system. . . . However, the Chamber is
not satisfied that [the Defendant] will receive a fair trial if transferred to Rwanda. First, it is
concerned that he will not be able to call witnesses residing outside Rwanda to the extent and
in a manner which will ensure a fair trial. Second, it accepts that the Defence will face
problems in obtaining witnesses residing in Rwanda . . . .”).
279. See HRW Brief, supra note 259, ¶¶ 25–40; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LAW
AND REALITY: PROGRESS IN JUDICIAL REFORM IN RWANDA 73–78 (2008) [hereinafter, LAW
AND REALITY], available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/rwanda07081.pdf.
280. Cf. LAW AND REALITY, supra note 279, at 73 (“Most prosecutions of genocide, like
many other court proceedings in Rwanda, depend on testimony from witnesses, both for the
prosecution and the defense.”).
281. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 201 (“Given the more explicit requirements of
11bis, referrals to Rwandan authorities would not be appropriate unless the Rwandan
government addresses problems relating to fair trials . . . .”).
282. See supra notes 243–46 and accompanying text.
283. Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 22 (emphasis
added); accord Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶ 26;
Munyakazi, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 10, ¶ 37. The Tribunal has held
that instances of known witness intimidation, harassment, arrests, and even torture and
killings create a general fear to testify without having to prove an individual fear. See, e.g.,
Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 21–22. The Tribunal
also notes that the criminalization of “genocide ideology” acts to make people fear that if
they testify on behalf of one accused of genocide, they too will be charged. See id. ¶ 21.
284. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 21.
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extremist Hutu views may be incarcerated, as a sufficient deterrent to
witness testimony to preclude the possibility of a fair trial.285 Yet the
criminalization of genocide ideology notwithstanding, the Transfer Law
guarantees protection for defendants’ witnesses, including immunity from
prosecution for testifying.286 Therefore, while the Tribunal’s concern over
the impairment of a fair trial due to lack of witness availability may be wellfounded, this is a key instance where the ICTR looks beyond the law in
evaluating 11bis requirements. This beyond-the-law approach is in stark
contrast with the Tribunal’s hesitancy to evaluate the facts concerning
witness protection in Bosnia and Herzegovina.287
This section dealt with Protectionists’ concern for defendants’ due
process guarantees, asserting that such guarantees are intrinsic to assuring a
fair trial. Under this theory, transfer should be delayed until such
protections are fully provided not only in law but in practice. The next
section presents the Protectionists’ belief that these trials should be
conducted mainly in the international courts in order to buttress the
international system and encourage domestic legal reform.
2. Toward Establishing a Consistent Set of International Legal Norms and
Incentivizing Domestic Judicial Reform
Another argument opposing the transfer of cases from international
tribunals to national jurisdictions is that such tribunals serve to establish
international legal standards288 as well as encourage domestic legal systems
to adopt Western legal norms.289 Regarding the former, by keeping cases in
the ad hoc tribunal system, international legal theorists hope to create a
substantive body of international criminal law with precedential value,
which could act to deter (or at minimum, punish) acts of mass violence and
genocide in the future.290 There is widespread agreement that the existence
of and lessons learned from the tribunals were a crucial step in the
formation of international law and subsequent international courts.291 In
fact, the international community has noted that the formation of the
Rwanda Tribunal has marked a major step forward in international
jurisprudence in recognizing the applicability of international humanitarian
285. See LAW AND REALITY, supra note 279, at 37–41; see also Hategekimana, Appeals
Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 21–22.
286. See supra notes 163–66 and accompanying text.
287. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. International attorneys Alhagi Marong,
Charles Chernor Jalloh, and David Kinnecome, in contrast with the ICTY, assert that the
Yugoslav Tribunal should likewise look to evidence pertaining to whether due process
protections provided for by law are in fact violated. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 182,
185.
288. See, e.g., George, supra note 40, at 70; Harhoff, supra note 5, at 584–85.
289. See BOHLANDER, supra note 209, at 3–4 (describing the Western requirements for
transferring ICTY cases to national jurisdictions, which are the same for the ICTR).
290. See Harhoff, supra note 5, at 584. Several State delegates (such as the U.K, Czech
Republic, and Argentina) at the Security Council meeting considering Resolution 955 shared
this view. See 955 Meeting, supra note 37, at 6–8.
291. See, e.g., GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 110. See generally Morris, supra
note 96.
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law to mass atrocities occurring within the confines of a national border.292
Aside from enabling international law to pierce the veil of domestic
sovereignty, the Tribunal and ICTY decisions have led to the
criminalization of specific acts—such as rape as a form of genocide and
media incitement to genocide—under international law that had previously
been beyond its scope.293 Preferring the ICTR’s right to hear cases over
that of Rwanda enhances the authority and scope of international law in the
present and the future.294
Another reason Protectionists support the ICTR’s jurisdictional primacy
speaks to the enormity of the crime committed and the shared responsibility
of all humanity to respond to the atrocity. They stress both the international
nature of the crimes committed and the corresponding duty the international
community bears in administering justice.295 Since the crimes committed
were crimes against humanity, then it is the international community’s
responsibility—not the responsibility of Rwanda or any other nation—to try
the perpetrators.296 Further, as the ICTR was created to deal with “a threat
to international peace and security,”297 an international tribunal is the
appropriate mechanism for dealing with related crimes.298 Therefore,
opponents of transfer assert, international crimes should be tried at the
international level not only to buttress the international system but to hold
the perpetrators of crimes against humanity accountable to all of
humankind.299
Finally, maintaining the possibility of transferring cases from the ICTR
to Rwanda, as long as strict 11bis requirements are met, incentivizes
Rwanda (and other interested domestic regimes) to reform its legal system

292. See Magnarella, supra note 28, at 431 (noting that “the ICTR represents an
important extension of international humanitarian law to internal conflicts”); 955 Meeting,
supra note 37, at 6–7 (Czech Republic’s delegate noting that “[t]he independent Commission
of Experts concluded that even though the conflict in Rwanda was a domestic one its
consequences affected the entire international community, inasmuch as fundamental
principles of international humanitarian law were violated”).
293. See GOLDSTONE & SMITH, supra note 13, at 103.
294. Cf. 955 Meeting, supra note 37, at 7 (Czech Republic’s delegate describing how the
formation of the tribunal signifies a breakthrough in the codification process of international
law). While most writings asserting the importance of the ICTR in establishing international
law relate directly to the debate over the Tribunal’s primacy, it logically applies to the
transfer debate as well.
295. See Brown, supra note 5, at 395 (“[E]xtraordinary jurisdictional priority is justified
by the compelling international humanitarian interests involved . . . .”).
296. See generally id. Several State delegates (Russia, Spain, and Nigeria) to the Security
Council meeting considering Resolution 955 shared this view. See 955 Meeting, supra note
37, at 2, 11–13.
297. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 35, at 1601.
298. See id.; see also Brown supra note 5, at 395 (“[E]xtraordinary jurisdictional priority
is justified . . . by the Security Council’s determination that the situation in the former
Yugoslavia, as well as that in Rwanda, constituted a threat to international peace and
security.”). Several State delegates (Russia, France, Pakistan) at the Security Council
meeting considering Resolution 955 shared this view. See 955 Meeting, supra note 37, at 2–
3, 10.
299. See, e.g., Brown supra note 5, at 395.
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and sufficiently integrate Western due process standards.300 New Zealand’s
delegate to the Security Council in 1994 said as much when he said that “in
the domestic courts weight must be given to the Arusha human rights
commitments” if genocide cases were to be dealt with by the Rwandan
courts.301 In fact, the policy of refusing to transfer cases from the ICTR to
Rwanda has in reality had this effect.
For example, the Rwandan Transfer Law, Death Penalty Abolition Law,
and amendment to the Death Penalty Abolition Law were all largely
implemented in order to increase the possibility that the ICTR would begin
to transfer cases to Rwanda for prosecution.302 The perceived response of
the Rwandan legislature regarding judicial reforms is noted both in the
Tribunal’s Reports to the United Nations and in the Tribunal’s decisions
itself. Prior to Rwanda’s adoption of the Death Penalty Abolition Law, the
ICTR President noted that “[a] welcome development since the previous
Completion Strategy report is that Rwanda has promulgated a law which,
among other things, excludes the application of the death penalty to cases
referred from the ICTR or from States.”303 Six months later, the ICTR
President responded in his report that, following the recent abolition of the
death penalty, the Prosecutor filed the first three requests for transfer to
Rwanda under 11bis.304 These statements suggest that the ICTR President
and Prosecutor view Rwanda’s judicial reform as a response to the
Tribunal’s firm transfer requirements.
Similarly, the Tribunal’s decisions regarding transfer requests reflect the
expectation that Rwanda will reform its judiciary to comport with
international standards.305 The recent statement of the Chief Prosecutor of
the ICTR at the United Nations Security Council reflects the position of
those who believe that strict requirements for transfer of cases encourages
Notably, the Prosecutor
necessary judicial reform in Rwanda.306
acknowledged that “[f]ollowing the Appeals Chamber decisions rejecting
referral cases to Rwanda for trial under rule 11 bis . . . Rwanda is in the
process of enacting . . . additional legislation to meet the remaining
300. See, e.g., BOHLANDER, supra note 209, at 3 (“To ‘relocate’ these cases, the domestic
judicial systems had to be based on democratic foundations and the national courts would
have to be enabled to accomplish their work with independence and impartiality, and with
due regard for the principles governing international humanitarian law and the protection of
human rights.”); Marong et al., supra note 24, at 161 (“[R]eferrals to Rwandan authorities
will be inappropriate unless the Rwandan government officially addresses problems
regarding fair trials and the death penalty.”).
301. 955 Meeting, supra note 37, at 5.
302. See supra Part I.B.2.
303. The President of the ICTR, Completion Strategy of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, ¶ 38, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2007/323 (May
31, 2007) [hereinafter ICTR Completion Strategy, May 2007].
304. See ICTR Completion Strategy, Nov. 2007, supra note 174, ¶ 35.
305. See, e.g., Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 40
(“The Appeals Chamber acknowledges the steps which Rwanda has recently taken to clarify
the issue of the applicable penalty for transfer cases.”); Gatete, Transfer Decision, supra note
8, ¶ 95 (“The Chamber concludes that the Republic of Rwanda has made notable progress in
improving its judicial system.”).
306. See Security Council Meeting 6134, supra note 10, at 12.
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concerns of the Appeals Chamber.”307 The Prosecutor also acknowledged
that Rwanda “has also accomplished much in [legal reform]: the abolition
of the death penalty; the incorporation of additional fair trial guarantees in
law; the upgrading of facilities; and the training of personnel” and stressed
that such capacity-building efforts should be encouraged.308 It is clear,
then, that the ICTR, at least to some measure, supports the Protectionists’
goal of calling for strict transfer requirements in order to encourage legal
reform in domestic jurisdictions.
Professor Burke-White, while supporting the notion that the transfer
mechanism incentivizes domestic judiciaries to undertake meaningful
reform, argues that such incentive lies mostly in its ability to act as a
“carrot” within reach.309 Maintaining strict transfer requirements is only
beneficial insofar as the domestic courts believe that they will be rewarded
through the successful transfer of cases to their jurisdiction.310 The desired
reforms, in the Bosnian context, resulted from the state courts’ receipt of
transfer cases and the expectation that they live up to international
standards.311 It is, in his view, the continued influence that the international
court may exert over the domestic proceedings that effectuates true
reform.312 This then raises the question of the effectiveness of holding the
carrot just beyond reach if the goal now is to create reform in practice, since
the legal reforms have already been put in place.
As illustrated above, the Protectionists prefer adjudication of
international criminal law at the international tribunal level for two primary
reasons. First, they are concerned with the ability of the transfer country to
conduct fair and impartial trials and value the due process guarantees that
the ICTR is able to provide.313 Second, they view the Tribunal as an
opportunity to bolster both international criminal law and advocate for legal
reform in transfer countries.314 They do so by acknowledging, in their
statements and in the Tribunal’s decisions, the progress the Rwandan
legislature has made in response to their strict transfer requirements while
continuing to deny referral requests, thus dangling the carrot of transfer just
beyond Rwanda’s grasp in order to spur reform not just in law but in
practice.315 The Foundationalists, as this Note refers to those who give
greater credence to the overarching goals of the ICTR as articulated in the
Tribunal’s founding documents, present a starkly opposing position.

307. Id. (referring to recent legislation dealing with witness protection and access to
testimony).
308. Id.
309. See Burke-White, supra note 110, at 324.
310. See id.
311. See id. at 324–25.
312. See id. at 347.
313. See supra notes 253–86 and accompanying text.
314. See supra notes 288–93, 300–01 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 300–12 and accompanying text.
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B. Foundationalists: Compelling Countervailing Interests Require
Transfers to Rwanda316
Those who advocate trying all crimes relating to the Rwandan Genocide
in Rwandan domestic courts, those who this Note refers to as
“Foundationalists,” argue primarily that the paramount interest of justice
requires that such cases be tried in Rwanda in order to satisfy the needs of
the Rwandan people. For them, the focus is on Rwandan courts because
that is where they perceive that justice can be effectively carried out.317
While motivated by different judicial theories, this loose collection of
scholars places prime importance on the unique ability of the national
judicial process to carry out post-Genocide justice. 318 Among the many
reasons given for the asserted deserved priority and effectiveness of
Rwandan justice is that as the country where the crimes occurred and
against whose people they were committed, Rwanda has the greatest
interest in seeing justice done.319 Moreover, trying top perpetrators in
Rwanda would contribute toward national reconciliation and enhance the
legitimacy and capacity of the Rwandan judiciary.320
1. The Founding Principles of the ICTR Point Toward Transfer to Rwanda
Many critics of the ICTR support trying cases in Rwandan courts because
they perceive that the victors’ interests, as well as the interests of Rwandan
society as a whole, are better served through domestic trials, even at the
expense of defendants’ due process rights.321 In general terms, “[i]f
national prosecutions are conducted with impartiality” and a close
approximation of due process, then international courts should defer to the
domestic process.322 Put another way, the international community must
316. Many of the arguments articulated in this subsection were first asserted by those who
opposed the primacy and/or model of the ICTR in comparison with trying cases in Rwanda
from the start. It therefore follows that many of the same arguments can be made for
transferring cases from the Tribunal to the Rwandan courts.
317. See, e.g., Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1259 (arguing that the geographic and
psychological disconnect between the ICTR and the Rwandan people undermines any
restorative effect the Tribunal’s trials may have on Rwandan society); Drumbl, supra note
27, at 624–26 (describing how, in the Rwandan case, an international tribunal may not be
able to achieve the retributive, deterrent, protective, and rehabilitative goals of post-genocide
trials without incorporating the national system); Howland & Calathes, supra note 35, at 163
(advocating an implementation of a hybrid Rwandan-international tribunal in Rwanda).
318. See Clark, supra note 25, at 772–74 (describing different models of justice and their
applicability to different situations); Howland & Calathes, supra note 35, at 149–56
(describing different models of justice, such as the educative, rehabilitative, deterrent,
retributive, incapacitative and restorative impact models).
319. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 196–97.
320. See id. at 186.
321. See, e.g., Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1284–85; cf. Tully, supra note 30, at 386–87
(noting that the international community should realize that in the pursuit of justice,
developing countries such as Rwanda may have to sacrifice some political and civil rights).
322. Morris, supra note 96, at 358 (drawing upon lessons of the ICTR to outline when the
ICC should defer to national jurisdictions); see also Harhoff, supra note 5, at 585
(advocating a synthesis of one view of the ICTR as an independent, isolated unit and another
view of the Tribunal as a political body that must defer to certain pressures).
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keep in mind the multifaceted purpose of the genocide and war crimes
trials, which includes the larger societal goals of national reconciliation and
judicial capacity building.323 This view is reflected in Security Council
Resolution 955, which includes a host of reasons and goals for forming the
ICTR.324 Paramount among those reasons, for the Foundationalists’
purposes, is the statement that “the prosecution of persons responsible . . .
would contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to the
restoration and maintenance of peace” and the recognition of “the need for
international cooperation to strengthen the courts and judicial system of
Rwanda.”325 The founding principles tend to elevate national reconciliation
and the rebuilding of the Rwandan judiciary over emphasizing the rights of
the defendant precisely because the concern in 1994 was to hold the
perpetrators of mass atrocity accountable and rebuild a severely fractured
society.326 Keeping in mind the founding principles of the ICTR and the
conceptions of justice and reconciliation, Rwandan courts must be more
involved—via transfer of cases or other means—in the ICTR’s adjudication
process.327
a. Justice for Victors, Not Victor’s Justice
At the core of the position of those who advocate swift transfer to
Rwanda is the contention that the interests of retributive justice—that is,
holding accountable those guilty of instigating the genocide—are best
served, and rest, in Rwanda. This argument draws heavily on early
323. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1232 (“[T]he purpose of legal intervention is to
promote peace in local communities by repairing injury, encouraging atonement, promoting
rehabilitation, and, eventually, facilitating reintegration.”); Møse, supra note 8, at 678–79.
Sharing this view, several States’ delegates, among them Russia, New Zealand, Pakistan,
Spain, Nigeria, and the United States, stated that the Tribunal’s objective, in addition to
restoring peace and security, should be to promote national reconciliation. See 955 Meeting,
supra note 37, at 2, 6, 10, 12, 13, 18. Nigeria’s delegate specifically noted that the ICTR “is
designed not to replace, but to complement, the sovereignty of Rwanda,” and that it will
“enhance the prospects of national reconciliation.” Id. at 13. This view, however, was not
unanimous. See id. at 7 (the Czech delegate stating, “[t]he Tribunal might become a vehicle
of justice, but it is hardly designed as a vehicle of reconciliation”). Delegates (from the
United Kingdom, Nigeria, and the United States) at the Security Council meeting also
underscored the importance of rebuilding Rwanda’s broken judiciary. See id. at 6, 13, 18.
324. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
325. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 35, preambular paras. Further, Security Council
Resolutions 1503 and 1534 stress the goal of national reconciliation and the importance of
judicial capacity building. See S.C. Res. 1503, supra note 14, ¶ 1 (“[The Security Council]
[c]alls on the international community to assist national jurisdictions . . . in improving their
capacity to prosecute cases transferred from the . . . ICTR . . . .”) (emphasis omitted); S.C.
Res. 1534, supra note 15, ¶¶ preamble, 9 (“[The Security Council] [c]ommend[s] the
important work of [the] Tribunal[] in contributing to . . . national reconciliation” and
“[r]ecalls that the strengthening of competent national judicial systems is crucially important
to the rule of law . . . and to the implementation of the . . . ICTR Completion
Strateg[y] . . . .”).
326. See Howland & Calathes, supra note 35, at 142 (“Simply, its objective is to address
and contribute to the improvement of the human rights situation in Rwanda. It should be the
prism through which the many objectives articulated for the ICTR are viewed.”).
327. See, e.g., Howland & Calathes, supra note 35, at 161–66.
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criticism of the legality of the Tribunal in the first place,328 and rests on the
fact that Rwandan courts have the greatest claim to cases relating to the
1994 Genocide under traditional notions of national jurisdiction.329
Rwanda has both unquestioned personal and territorial jurisdiction over
cases arising from the 1994 Genocide, as the crimes were committed by
Rwandans, against Rwandans, on Rwandan soil.330 Read maximally, this
claim undercuts the basis for the ICTR’s delegated primacy, while at a
minimum advances a reason for the ICTR to transfer cases to Rwanda’s
national courts.
However, ICTR critics assert, the Tribunal does not provide justice for
the Rwandan victims of the genocide. Rather, the Tribunal “was reaping
the wrath of the Rwandans each time it pursued a leader to be
prosecuted.”331 These critics attribute such resentment toward the Tribunal
to the disparities in sentencing and treatment between ICTR indictees, who
by and large are the highest-level perpetrators, and those tried in local
courts.332 As Professor Madeline Morris points out, the combination of the
local Rwandan plea system and the Westernized ICTR results in
perpetuating the culture of impunity, in which those tried for lesser offenses
in Rwanda receive vastly reduced sentences, while the architects and top
perpetrators of the genocide, tried at the ICTR, receive better treatment and
detention conditions.333 This creates a perception where no one is held
accountable and thus undermines the goals of retributive justice.334 To
counter this undesirable outcome and promote a sense of justice in Rwanda,
at least some cases concerning top perpetrators should be transferred to
Rwandan courts.335 While this view advocates a retributive conception of
justice—let Rwandans be accountable to Rwandans—the next section
explores the Foundationalists’ assertion that transferring cases to Rwandan
courts will in fact facilitate social reconciliation.
b. “[T]he prosecution of persons responsible . . . would contribute to the
process of national reconciliation . . . .”336
Advocates of transfer to Rwanda also assert that trials in Rwandan courts
would best achieve Resolution 955’s goal of supporting national
328. See 955 Meeting, supra note 37, at 9 (Brazil’s delegate expressing concern for the
manner in which the Tribunal was created and underscoring that “the assertion and exercise
of criminal jurisdiction are essential attributes of national statehood”); Popoff, supra note 97,
at 377–78.
329. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
330. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 187; Brown, supra note 5, at 391–92.
331. Morris, supra note 35, at 694.
332. See Harhoff, supra note 5, at 584; Morris, supra note 96, at 354–55.
333. See Morris, supra note 35, at 693–94; Morris, supra note 96, at 354–55. The local
plea system, enacted in large part to reduce prison overcrowding and promote reconciliation,
operates to reduce (or in some cases nullify) sentences in return for full confessions. See
Morris, supra note 27, at 358–61; Raper, supra note 7, at 32–33.
334. See Morris, supra note 27, at 364 (describing the perception of the plea system as “a
program of impunity”).
335. See id.; Morris, supra note 96, at 357 (applying lessons of the ICTR to the ICC).
336. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 35, preambular para.
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reconciliation. Proponents of using Rwandan courts to adjudicate genocide
crimes stress the rehabilitative nature of both airing grievances and bringing
those accountable to justice,337 and emphasize the role the Tribunal should
have in promoting human rights within Rwanda.338 Reconciliation is a
complex process that aims to rebuild fractured relationships between
antagonists and involves more than punishing the perpetrators (and in some
cases, no punishment).339 Such a process can only be achieved when a
certain confluence of factors are met, which allows for the public’s
widespread knowledge and internalization of the proceedings and results.340
According to Professors Mark A. Drumbl and Erika R. George, trials are
only effective for the sake of reconciliation if the public is aware of the
details of the proceedings and its outcome, and if the defendant recognizes
his/her wrong as such.341 This is a particularly acute problem when dealing
with mass crimes of “radical evil,” where, at the time the crimes were
committed, the perpetrator did not view the crimes as deviant but rather as
normal behavior.342 In order for the aggrieved society to come to terms
with the past and move forward, trials must be highly transparent and
public.343 This enables the public to hear a truthful accounting of the
atrocities, become satisfied that perpetrators are being held accountable, and
force the perpetrators to face their victims, thus eroding the perception of
impunity.344
While the renowned post-Apartheid South African Truth and
Reconciliation Committees were concerned chiefly with establishing an
accounting in order to facilitate healing,345 the Rwandan context requires
emphasis on disseminating the knowledge that the perpetrators are being
punished and ensuring that the perpetrators internalize the wrongs they have
committed.346 Professor Drumbl describes the Rwandan context as a
“dualist postgenocidal” society in which the victims and perpetrators
continue to live side-by-side and where, prior to and during the genocide,
participation in the atrocities was not viewed as morally abhorrent.347 Wide
dissemination of the trials and perpetrators’ internalization of shame for
their crimes is necessary in order to signal that genocide ideology and
ethnic hatred is no longer endorsed by the Rwandan people.348 In these
cases, trials are most effective when they are located near the populace,
when they are conducted in a language accessible to all, when the

337. See generally Clark, supra note 25; Drumbl, supra note 1.
338. See Howland & Calathes, supra note 35, at 142.
339. See Clark, supra note 7, at 770; Howland & Calathes, supra note 35, at 155–56.
340. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1253–63.
341. See id.; George, supra note 40, at 71.
342. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1253–55.
343. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1259; George, supra note 40, at 71.
344. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1232; Drumbl, supra note 27, at 567–68.
345. See George, supra note 40, at 68; see also Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1253–63
(distinguishing the South African approach from the Rwandan context).
346. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1256–63.
347. See id. at 1241–52.
348. See id. at 1232, 1253–63.
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proceedings are disseminated through the mass media, and where
reasonably efficient results may be reached.349
While the ICTR recognizes the importance of publicizing the
proceedings,350 critics do not view the Tribunal’s efforts in this matter as
sufficient to cure the public’s exclusion from the process.351 Particularly,
the ICTR’s emphasis on using technology to broadcast Tribunal
proceedings overlooks the fact that the majority of the population lives
without electricity and is unaware of any of the Tribunal’s activities.352
Some Foundationalists, such as Professor Drumbl, recognize that fair
trials are necessary in order to achieve the desired reconciliatory effect.353
Therefore, they do not advocate trials without due process protections.
Rather, they argue, given both the importance of national reconciliation and
the reality that Rwanda is a developing country recovering from societal
destruction, it is unrealistic to expect and require every due process
protection before transferring cases to Rwanda.354 In their view, it is
sufficient that Rwandan courts provide a basic framework for defendants’
rights.355 Similarly, Foundationalists also recognize that the Rwandan
judiciary continues to require assistance in its reform and rebuilding efforts.
The next section details how they believe the transfer process may serve to
assist in the reconstruction process.
c. “[T]he need for international cooperation to strengthen the courts and
judicial system of Rwanda”356 Supports Transfer
Advocates of transferring cases to Rwanda also stress that if the ICTR
were to transfer cases to Rwanda and work closely with the domestic
349. See id. at 1259–60; George, supra note 40, at 71 (“[T]he fact that the ICTR was
geographically and psychologically distant from those most affected . . . undercut the ICTR’s
legitimacy in eyes of critical domestic audiences.”).
350. See, e.g., ICTR Completion Strategy, May 2009, supra note 16 ¶¶ 61–62 (describing
the establishment of ten information centers throughout Rwanda, genocide education
programs, and radio broadcasts of the proceedings).
351. See George, supra note 40, at 71; Howland & Calathes, supra note 35, at 155.
352. See Higonnet, supra note 4, at 419–22.
353. See Drumbl, supra note 27, at 628 (noting that the right to a full answer and defense
is “a sacrosanct pillar of the rule of law”).
354. See id. (noting that when a country experiences a genocide perpetrated by mass
participatory violence, “it would be inappropriate to take offense at the fact that the presence
of lawyers cannot be systematically ensured at all the trials” (quoting Daniel de Beer,
Commentary: THE ORGANIC LAW OF 30 AUGUST 1996 ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE
PROSECUTION OF OFFENCES CONSTITUTING THE CRIME OF GENOCIDE OR CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY 25 n.2 (1997)); Morris, supra note 96, at 358 (recommending, based on
observations of the ICTR, that the ICC should try to “foster . . . national justice proceedings”
as long as “national prosecutions are conducted with impartiality and something approaching
adequate due process”).
355. See Howland & Calathes, supra note 35, at 166 (“Punishment responses and
responses to human rights violations must also accept the deficiencies of orthodox western
criminological objectives for a justice system.”); Sennett & Noone, supra note 25, at 447
(“The degree to which the Rwandan legal system should conform to systems in the West is
subject to endless debate. It would be sufficient for the international community to be
satisfied that the basic tenets of due process exist in handling the serious cases.”).
356. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 35, at 1601.
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courts, rather than operate as a completely separate institution, the Tribunal
will be more likely to fulfill its mandate of strengthening the Rwandan
judiciary.357 One of the primary reasons Rwanda requested that the
Security Council convene an international tribunal was that the Rwandan
judiciary was completely destroyed in 1994.358 In so doing, the nascent
Rwandan government was hoping to create a hybrid system in which
international and Rwandan judges would work in tandem.359 While that
was not the outcome, transferring cases to Rwanda and maintaining a close
working relationship between the domestic courts and the Tribunal can,
with the support of the international community, work toward strengthening
Rwanda’s justice sector.360
As discussed in Part I.B.3.a., the monitoring and revocation mechanism
not only allows the Tribunal to continue to influence the proceedings but
may incentivize the domestic judiciary to comport with international
standards, in effect training them to perform according to such principles.361
While the recent ICTR Completion Strategies have placed a renewed focus
on strengthening the Rwandan judiciary,362 critics maintain that the
Tribunal’s recent efforts do little to overcome years of neglect.363 The
ICTR Prosecutor has recently acknowledged the necessity of continuing to
strengthen the Rwandan judiciary in order to better handle transfer cases
and its own domestic caseload.364 Similarly, Security Council Member
States link capacity building to transfer cases, stressing that the ICTR must
strengthen the administration of justice in national jurisdictions with the
express purpose of transferring cases.365

357. See Drumbl, supra note 27, at 625 (noting that had the U.N. spent more resources on
building institutions to adjudicate genocide crimes in Rwanda, the goal of recreating the
justice system would have been facilitated); Howland & Calathes, supra note 35, at 162–63.
358. See supra notes 25–35 and accompanying text.
359. See Howland & Calathes, supra note 35, at 162–63.
360. See id. (noting that the international community should revisit the hybridity
concept); George, supra note 40, at 77 (contrasting the author’s critique of the ICTR with the
Special Court for Sierra Leone); Tully, supra note 30, at 412 (noting that continued
international assistance is “the best means of ensuring that the judges can live up to [the]
enormous task”).
361. See supra notes 212–14, 309–11 and accompanying text.
362. See, e.g., ICTR Completion Strategy, May 2009, supra note 16, ¶¶ 64–65 (describing
ICTR-sponsored judicial training activities, such as training sessions in relevant law and
online legal research); Møse, supra note 8, at 678–79.
363. See George, supra note 40, at 71 (“[U]ntil the recent focus on the ICTR’s completion
strategy, the ICTR had done very little to help strengthen the ability of local courts . . . .”).
364. See Security Council Meeting 6134, supra note 10, at 12 (urging Member States to
“redouble their efforts in support of capacity-building for the Rwandan legal system”
considering Rwanda’s “burden of dealing with the cases transferred not only from the
Tribunal but also . . . from other national jurisdictions, as well as many other domestic
cases”).
365. See, e.g., id. at 25 (“One of the key actions for dealing with the caseload of the
Tribunals and contributing to the development of capacities for the administration of justice
in the States concerned is the referral of new cases to national jurisdictions.”). The United
States delegate also appreciated the efforts of the ICTR Prosecutor in requesting transfers to
Rwanda and commended “the work done by Rwanda and other countries to build up the
capacity the Rwandan legal system needs to make such transfers possible.” Id. at 27.
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However, some, as stated above, advocate transfer in order to build
Rwandan judicial capacity; rather than initiating new training programs, the
ICTR should transfer cases to Rwanda, accompanied by monitors to ensure
that the judiciary adheres to international standards.366 The ICTR
Prosecutor, when requesting transfer under Rule 11bis, has repeatedly
requested monitors with the transfer to ensure that the judiciary fulfills its
function adequately.367 The Prosecutor has stressed that, according to the
ICTR Statute, the proposed monitors, as independent observers, would
“have access to court proceedings, documents and records relating to . . .
case[s], as well as access to all places of detention.”368 In fact, the
Prosecutor has refrained from compelling the transfer of four RPF members
from Rwanda to the ICTR for trial, on the basis that that the ICTR monitors
confirmed that the Rwandan courts observed fair trial standards.369 Given
the ICTR Prosecutor’s own admissions, the monitors accompanying the
transferred cases would have the ability to be involved in all stages of the
proceedings and would ensure a fair trial in Rwanda.
This section so far has addressed the Foundationalists’ assertions that
transfer will serve judicial objectives—that is, it will facilitate justice for
the Rwandan people, contribute toward national reconciliation, and
strengthen the Rwandan judiciary. The next section discusses a deeper
underlying criticism of requiring certain standards to be met before
permitting transfer. Here, they argue that imposing such conditions adopts
an imperialist attitude by assuming the superiority of Western, largely
Anglo-American legal systems over any other tradition of jurisprudence.
2. Requiring Transfer Countries To Meet Western Legal Standards
Approaches Legal Imperialism
A serious ideological critique of requiring transfer countries to meet
certain legal standards, as represented by the 11bis requirements, is that
imposing such legal norms on non-Western countries is a form of neoimperialism.370 Conceptions of fair trial, comprised of specific due process
provisions such as the right to legal counsel or the guilty plea, are Western
legal constructs foreign to many countries, including Rwanda.371 Professor
Michael Bohlander points out that some of the required procedures are in
fact unique to the Anglo-American common law tradition and even foreign
to Continental civil law systems.372 Critics accuse the international
366. See Tully, supra note 30, at 412.
367. See Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶¶ 27–28;
Kanyarukiga, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 135, ¶¶ 36–37; Gatete,
Transfer Decision, supra note 8, ¶¶ 90–92.
368. Gatete, Transfer Decision, supra note 8, ¶ 92.
369. See Security Council Meeting 6134, supra note 10, at 33.
370. See Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1313–14; George, supra note 40, at 64–65; Howland &
Calathes, supra note 35, at 147–48, 166. See generally BOHLANDER, supra note 209.
371. See BOHLANDER, supra note 209, at 24–25.
372. See id. at 30 (noting that the required criminalization of command responsibility is in
fact contrary to German law, which recognizes “Schuldprinzip,” the principle of individual
guilt).
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community of adopting due process provisions wholesale and applying
them to non-Western countries, regardless of the cultures, legal norms, and
traditions of the transfer country.373 Even when domestic systems have
adopted Western procedure, the ICTR’s lack of consideration for and
misunderstanding of domestic procedure and legal norms has on occasion
led the ICTR to misinterpret Rwandan domestic law, particularly when
evaluating transfer cases.374 For example, in Hategekimana, decided on
December 4, 2008, the Appeals Chamber refused to look beyond what the
litigants presented, holding that it lacked the information to determine
whether the amendment to the Death Penalty Abolition Law entered into
force and that therefore, the Law was still ambiguous, even though in
actuality the amendment entered into force on December 1, 2008.375 This
perceived ignorance of domestic law, the argument goes, in effect runs the
risk of “undermin[ing] the local population’s trust in the idea of the rule of
law as propagated by the international community.”376
In this view, then, it is unrealistic and patronizing to require the transfer
country to meet the 11bis transfer requirements in order to qualify as a
transfer state. The advocated solution to this perceived colonization of the
legal systems of these former colonies377 is to discard a strict adherence to
these requirements and instead recommend transfer so long as certain basic
provisions are met.378 Others suggest that Rwanda adopt, and the
international community support, a hybrid system that integrates aspects of

373. See id. at 25 (“[T]he international community has no real intention in observing—
and above all respecting—the legal traditions of the countries where the conflicts
occurred . . . .”); Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1231 (“[In forming the ICTR,] the international
legal community responded to atrocity in Rwanda simply by using as boilerplate the Statute
of the ICTY.”); Howland & Calathes, supra note 35, at 154 (asserting that the adoption of
Western criminal justice objectives ignores the context of mass human rights violations).
374. See Morris, supra note 96, at 352–53. Further, the ICTR is hesitant to look beyond
what the prosecution and defense provides them with concerning Rwandan law. See, e.g.,
Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 38 (“[T]here is no
information before the Appeals Chamber to indicate that this law has entered into force.”).
375. Compare Hategekimana, Appeals Chamber Transfer Decision, supra note 19, ¶ 38
(“[T]here is no information before the Appeals Chambers to indicate that [the Death Penalty
Abolition] law has entered force.”), with Law No. 66/2008 of Nov. 21, 2008, Official
Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, Dec. 1, 2008, p. 99 (“[L]ife imprisonment with special
provisions . . . shall not be pronounced in respect of cases transferred to Rwanda from the
[ICTR] and from other States . . . concerning the transfer of cases to the Republic of Rwanda
from the [ICTR] and from other States.”).
376. BOHLANDER, supra note 209, at 27; see also Drumbl, supra note 1, at 1231
(“[Implementing a Western prosecutorial model] may create a disconnect between the
pursuit of trials and the consequences these trials have on local communities, national
reconciliation, and international peace.”); George, supra note 40, at 64 (“[T]he ‘structural
simplicity’ pursued by the dominant model of prosecution and punishment may discount the
complexity of justice and reconciliation.”).
377. See BOHLANDER, supra note 209, at 31 (“Wholesale replacement of legal traditions
because of impatience based on lack of planning or foresight, ignorance or unwillingness to
understand them, is a violation of the historical identity of a people.”).
378. See supra notes 354–54 and accompanying text.
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both Western judicial systems and traditional judicial methods,379 such as
those subsequently adopted by East Timor, Cambodia, and Sierra Leone.380
While the international community has responded to these criticisms in
forming subsequent international (or, “internationalized”) courts, including
the ICC, the ICTR has not integrated such criticisms into its evaluation of
transfer requests.
While critics of the ICTR’s transfer policy have been primarily
concerned with according sufficient weight to countervailing judicial
interests—such as national reconciliation and judicial capacity building—
and international legal imperialism,381 they have not directly addressed the
Protectionists’ concerns regarding due process protections and the risk of
victor’s justice.382 Similarly, while Protectionists have devoted much
energy to advocating defendants’ due process rights and the role the ICTR
plays in establishing international law and domestic legal reform,383 they
have seldom addressed Foundationalists’ larger concerns of using
prosecution to facilitate widespread justice, reconciliation, and judicial
capacity building in Rwanda.384 Part III of this Note attempts to address the
deficits in the debate and put forth a workable solution to the ICTR’s
transfer dilemma, which can serve as a useful paradigm for resolving future
international and domestic jurisdictional disputes. Specifically, Part III
argues that the ICTR, when evaluating transfer requests, should adopt a
comprehensive balancing approach, wherein it weighs due process concerns
against the Foundationalists’ countervailing interests in order to make a
particularized determination on the transfer question. Part III also argues
that, in light of the differing tests the ICTR and ICTY use in evaluating
transfer requests, the Tribunal should adopt a unified approach and place a
renewed confidence in its monitoring system in order to cure itself of the
appearances of dealing in double standards.
III. ABANDON THE STRICT APPLICATION OF 11BIS WHILE ACCOUNTING
FOR ADEQUATE DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE
BALANCING APPROACH
Part II of this Note analyzed the controversy surrounding the recent ICTR
decisions not to transfer cases to Rwanda. Opponents of transfer—the
Protectionists—argue that the guarantee of due process protections, ensured
through a strict application of 11bis, is necessary to outweigh the risk of a
victor’s justice outcome in Rwanda.385 The Protectionists further argue that
keeping high profile transfer cases in the international system is necessary

379. See BOHLANDER, supra note 209, at 6 (describing the proposed hybrid composition
of the international humanitarian law court in Bosnia and Herzegovina); George, supra note
40, at 77–78. See generally Clark, supra note 25.
380. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
381. See supra Part II.B.
382. See supra Part II.A.
383. See supra Part II.A.
384. See supra Part II.B.
385. See supra Part II.A.1.
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in order to create a coherent body of international law, as well as to
encourage the liberalization of domestic judiciaries.386
Conversely, advocates of transfer—the Foundationalists—argue that a
compelling countervailing interest of justice requires that such cases be
transferred; that the trials of top perpetrators in Rwanda would contribute
toward achieving justice for the victims of the genocide,387 promote
reconciliation for Rwandan society,388 and would serve to strengthen the
domestic judiciary.389 Additionally, they argue that a strict application of
11bis, and the due process protections guaranteed thereby, implies the
inherent superiority of Western legal jurisprudence and runs the risk of
legal imperialism.390
This part argues that while procedural protections are necessary to
guarantee the rights of the accused, such an approach runs the risk of
ignoring the Tribunal’s Security Council mandated mission.
Yet
denouncing the very primacy of the ICTR and its procedural protections is
not conducive to remedying the impasse. Such a position offers no useful
remedy other than the abolition of the Tribunal as it stands and drastically
overlooks the importance of defendants’ rights within the judicial process.
After analyzing these critiques of both positions, this part suggests that the
question of transfer remains a mixed question of law and fact for the
Tribunal, one in which it should adopt a comprehensive balancing approach
wherein the judges consider not only the factors comprising a due process
analysis under 11bis, but balance such interests against how such a transfer
will effectuate the Tribunal’s overarching mandate of providing justice,
restoring peace, promoting reconciliation, and enhancing the Rwandan
judiciary.
A. A Critique of a Strict Application of Due Process Requirements
This section identifies the deficiencies in maintaining the strict
application of due process requirements in evaluating transfer requests.
Specifically, this section asserts that a structuralist reading of the Tribunal’s
founding documents together with Rule 11bis strongly suggests that the
Tribunal has thus far read too many compulsory requirements into 11bis at
the expense of fulfilling its Security Council delegated mandate. While
Security Council Resolution 955 lists specific motivating factors for the
Tribunal’s formation,391 reinforced by Resolutions 1503 and 1534,392 Rule
11bis contains only the general requirement that the Trial Chamber be
satisfied that the accused will receive a fair trial,393 along with the caveat

386.
387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.
393.

See supra Part II.A.2.
See supra Part II.B.1.a.
See supra Part II.B.1.b.
See supra Part II.B.1.c.
See supra Part II.B.2.
See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
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that the death penalty may not be enforced.394 The specific due process
protections enumerated in the ICTR Statute only enter the 11bis analysis
through the judicial interpretation that the rights set out in Article 20 of the
ICTR Statute comprise 11bis fair trial standards.395 Thus, it follows that the
Security Council placed the aforementioned objectives of the Tribunal over
the specific procedural mechanisms through which they were to be
achieved.396
Security Council Resolutions 955, 1503, and 1534 strongly suggest that
the purpose of the ICTR includes, inter alia, using the prosecutions to
facilitate national reconciliation, restore peace, and strengthen the Rwandan
courts and that these considerations are to be preserved in the transfer
process.397 These same goals are listed in Resolutions 1503 and 1534,398
which were passed for the express purpose of formulating a completion
strategy for the ICTR.399 The resolutions explicitly provide that such a
completion strategy, with those purposes in mind, include the transfer of
cases to national jurisdictions, including Rwanda.400 These three Security
Council resolutions, when read together, strongly suggest the Council’s
interest in using the ICTR to contribute to national reconciliation and
judicial capacity building—which is undoubtedly best achieved through
working within Rwanda401—and includes the use of transfers as part of the
Tribunal’s completion strategy.
Conversely, neither Resolution 955 nor the Statute of the ICTR requires
due process guarantees for the accused if transferred to a national
jurisdiction. The Resolution is silent on the matter, while Articles 20 and
21 of the ICTR Statute guarantee rights of the accused insofar as the case is
heard by the Tribunal.402 Rule 11bis of the ICTR Rules of Procedure,
written by the Tribunal pursuant to Article 14 of the Statute,403 provides
that the Tribunal must find that the transfer country will guarantee a “fair
trial,”404 but does not explicitly state that all rights of the accused in
Articles 20 and 21 must be provided for with no exception. Rather, in the
first transfer cases ten years later, the judges extended the general fair trial
provision to encompass all of the rights of the accused listed in Articles 20
and 21.405 Additionally, Article 14 of the ICTR Statute recognizes that the
unique circumstances of the Rwandan genocide may require that procedure
deviate from the prior established norm, as it states that the judges shall
adopt the rules of the ICTY “with such changes as they deem necessary.”406
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.

See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 140–45 and accompanying text.
See supra note 326 and accompanying text.
See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
See supra note 325 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 114–15 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.B.1.
See supra notes 142–45 and accompanying text.
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 135–45 and accompanying text.
ICTR Statute, supra note 55, art. 14 (emphasis added).
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Therefore, read together with the stated goals of the Tribunal enumerated in
Security Council Resolutions 955, 1503, and 1534, the language of the
ICTR Statute and Rule 11bis, on their face, strongly suggest that there is no
strict textual basis for requiring the transfer state to provide full due process
protections for the accused at the expense of other countervailing
interests.407
Though, as the Protectionists put forth, a benefit of applying a strict due
process requirement for transfer cases is the effect of encouraging judicial
reform in the transfer country,408 the Tribunal must be careful not to quell
Rwanda’s hope that such reform will be rewarded. While judicial reform is
certainly important, the international community must be careful to avoid
the appearances of legal imperialism and cultural superiority.409 Such
appearances are only exacerbated when the Rwandan judiciary and
legislature constantly revise the law and improve adjudication to conform to
the ICTR’s requirements, only for the Tribunal to find additional reasons
for denying transfer.410 Furthermore, requiring an in-depth analysis into the
application of the law of the domestic country by the Tribunal’s judges,
who are not experts in the transfer country’s law, opens up room for error
and misapplication of the rule.411 This in turn encourages a TribunalRwanda game of cat-and-mouse, which over time runs the risk of further
eroding the public’s confidence in the ICTR’s sincerity in working with
national jurisdictions.412
In order to maintain the public’s confidence, the Tribunal must ensure
that it applies the same legal standards for all transfer cases, regardless of
the proposed transfer location or the timing of the request within the
judicial proceedings. Rwanda’s seemingly Sisyphean task is highlighted by
the ICTR’s and ICTY’s application of a much lesser scrutiny for
transferring cases within Europe,413 including to Bosnia and
Herzegovina.414 Further, the ICTR itself applies differing standards when
deciding whether to transfer a case to Rwanda; the Prosecutor has found
Rwanda offers sufficient judicial safeguards to merit the transfer of fiftyThe
five non-indicted cases to Rwanda’s national jurisdiction.415
Prosecutor also has enough confidence in the Rwandan judiciary to trust it
to try four members of the RPF and withhold seeking transfer of those cases
to the Tribunal.416 Yet the ICTR judges continually find those same

407. Read together, the language of the Security Council resolutions, ICTR Statute, and
11bis adds statutory support to the Foundationalists’ argument that the Tribunal should
facilitate transfer so long as the national government provides some measure of basic due
process protections. See supra notes 353–54 and accompanying text.
408. See supra notes 300–08 and accompanying text.
409. See supra Part II.B.2.
410. See supra Part I.B.2.
411. See supra note 374 and accompanying text.
412. See supra note 376 and accompanying text.
413. See supra Part I.B.3.b.
414. See supra Part I.B.3.a.
415. See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text.
416. See supra note 369 and accompanying text.
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safeguards insufficient to allow transfer of indicted cases.417 The
protections and rights accorded to a defendant should not hinge on the stage
of her indictment or on the official who determines transfer.418 As a
developing country’s “respect for the alleged superiority of the rule of
law . . . will to a very large extent depend on their perception that the same
rules apply to all,”419 the Tribunal must be wary not to appear to be
applying one standard to Rwanda and another to the rest of the international
community, even if the Tribunal has valid reasons for doing so.
B. A Warning for the Foundationalists: Legal Cultural Relativism Can
Lead to Victor’s Justice and Serious Violations of Non-Derogable Rights
In their efforts to critique the structure of the ICTR, Foundationalists run
the risk of falling into the morass and empty rhetoric of cultural relativism
and discounting the positive effects of requiring a due process analysis in
evaluating whether to transfer a case to a national jurisdiction. While the
ICTR, and ad hoc tribunal systems in general, may ignore domestic legal
traditions and impose Western legal standards,420 that in itself is not a basis
to assume due process protections are without merit. After all, there have
been instances in the past of Rwandan courts meting out victor’s justice
without due regard for defendants’ rights or adequate protections for the
parties involved, despite the existence of law providing for Western due
process protections.421 Moreover, while the Tribunal should be careful of
not dealing in double standards422 or adopting previous tribunal models
wholesale,423 the Tribunal should nevertheless look outside the letter of the
domestic law and conduct a factual analysis to determine whether
protections are met in actuality.424 Conducting a thorough legal analysis of
whether domestic law meets ICTR requirements without a concern for
whether the law is applied as such is a waste of resources and makes the
Tribunal a mockery of its own processes. Therefore, despite concerns of
legal imperialism, the Tribunal should continue to conduct a due process
analysis as a mixed question of law and fact.425
Additionally, one should not discount the positive effect that a strict
application of an enhanced 11bis has had on Rwandan domestic law. Not
only has Rwanda reformed its legal code to conform with ICTR
requirements,426 the Rwandan legislature has, ceteris paribus, at times
417. See Part I.B.3.c.
418. See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 197–98 (describing the Prosecutor’s independent
application of 11bis factors prior to granting transfer to non-indicted defendants despite the
Tribunal’s continual refusals to transfer indicted defendants).
419. See BOHLANDER, supra note 209, at 31.
420. See supra Part II.B.2.
421. See supra notes 249–82 and accompanying text.
422. See supra notes 413–18 and accompanying text.
423. See supra note 373 and accompanying text.
424. See supra Part I.B.3.c.
425. By analyzing Rwandan law and practice, the Tribunal already treats the 11bis
analysis as a mixed question of law and fact. See supra Part I.B.3.c.
426. See supra Part I.B.2.
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exceeded the ICTR’s requirements for transferring cases. For example,
while the 2007 Transfer Law guarantees that the death penalty will not be
imposed for transfer cases427—thus meeting the 11bis prohibition against
the use of the death penalty428—the subsequent Death Penalty Abolition
Law completely abolished the death penalty for any crime.429 While such
liberalization and reformation of the Rwandan judiciary is not judicial
capacity building as envisioned by the Security Council resolutions per
se,430 such progressive reforms should nevertheless be encouraged as part
of Rwanda’s civic, political, and social restoration.
Similarly, one should not ignore the role that the ICTR (and other ad hoc
tribunals) plays in creating a body of coherent international law and its
positive effects in establishing precedent in trying international crimes
against humanity.431 While establishing international legal precedents is
not the paramount purpose of the ICTR, and should not be preferred to the
pursuit of overall justice, it nevertheless may be a benefit worth
pursuing.432 It behooves Foundationalists to recognize that a policy that at
times results in withholding from national courts may nonetheless produce
beneficial results.
Parts III.A and III.B focused on both the Protectionists’ and
Foundationalists’ failure to offer satisfying solutions to the transfer
dilemma. While each position may have valid reasons for asserting either
the importance of the strict due process requirement or the societal benefits
of trying cases in the domestic courts, neither suggest an innovative method
to both ensure the sufficiency of the Rwandan judicial process and offer a
way to transfer ICTR cases to Rwanda. The next section suggests a
modified, particularized approach which the Tribunal should utilize in
evaluating transfer cases, wherein the judges should consider the arguments
of both the Protectionists and Foundationalists.
C. A Consistently Applied Comprehensive Balancing Approach
Encapsulates the Protectionists’ Fears and the Foundationalists’
Aspirations
1. A Comprehensive Balancing Approach
In order to resolve both the Protectionists’ and Foundationalists’
concerns, judges should apply a comprehensive balancing approach to
evaluate whether to transfer a case from the ICTR to a national jurisdiction.
Like in many domestic common law jurisdictions, the Tribunal’s judges
must consider a variety of factors when determining this mixed question of
law and fact. To date, the Tribunal has claimed to apply a totality of the
427. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
428. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
429. See supra notes 173–74 and accompanying text.
430. See supra Part II.B.1.c.
431. See supra notes 295–98 and accompanying text.
432. See supra notes 293–93 and accompanying text (noting developments in
international law as a result of prosecution at the ad hoc tribunals).
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circumstances test;433 in reality, this is not the case. Rather, the Tribunal
has applied a totality of the circumstances test to determine whether due
process requirements have been met under Rule 11bis, considering each
ICTR Statute Article 20 and 21 due process factor independently.434
Further, the Tribunal has used such a test to determine whether the facts on
the ground in their totality comport with specific due process requirements,
such as access to witnesses.435 This is a much more limited—and
ineffective—test than the comprehensive balancing approach which this
Note advocates.
The Tribunal should widen the scope of its test to consider the
multiplicity of objectives that the Security Council has mandated.436 The
ultimate inquiry of the Tribunal should consist of a balancing act between
the goals of national reconciliation and restoration437 on one end and
concern for the rights of the defendant, including full due process
protections,438 on the other. Each factor to be considered, then, is each
stated purpose of the ICTR and the specific fair trial concerns. Of course
these factors are in reality interrelated—encouraging respect for due process
protections within Rwanda helps to reinforce legal norms and popular
conceptions of rule of law within the Rwandan judiciary.439 The Tribunal’s
inquiry is thus reoriented toward its mandated goals by shifting the focus of
its analysis from the question of whether the totality of present due process
factors meets 11bis fair trial requirements to whether the totality of the
various interests, weighed against the interest of a fair trial, merit
transferring the case to a national jurisdiction.
While the judicial application of such a broad test may be difficult to
effectuate, it need not be impossible. The Tribunal already conducts a
limited totality of the circumstances test with respect to due process
requirements, in which it considers a multiplicity of factors together.440
Here, the judicial challenge is teasing out a workable set of sub-factors to
evaluate the overarching countervailing interests of retributive justice,
national reconciliation, and judicial capacity building.441 The Tribunal may
look at the substance of the case—in particular, the gravity of the crime
committed or the number of people the defendant is alleged to have harmed
(directly or indirectly)—in order to gauge what impact a trial in the
domestic courts may have on national reconciliation.442 If the case involves
a question of law new to the Rwandan courts, or the sheer scale of the case
433. See supra notes 239–46 and accompanying text.
434. See supra notes 140–49 and accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 239–46 and accompanying text.
436. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
437. See supra Part II.B.1.
438. See supra Part II.A.1.
439. See supra notes 300–08 and accompanying text.
440. See supra Part I.B.1.
441. See supra Part II.B.1.
442. Although the ICTR judges have limited their analysis to evaluating whether the
transfer country’s due process protections meet 11bis’ requirements, the Prosecutor has
already weighed other factors when considering whether to transfer non-indicted defendants.
See Marong et al., supra note 24, at 197.
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would involve additional Rwandan legal practitioners, perhaps the interests
of judicial capacity building would become salient.443 Whatever the factors
the Tribunal would consider, the goal is not to delineate a clear answer but
to reintroduce such concerns into the judicial equation.
In so doing, the Tribunal would recognize the many valid concerns on
both sides. It would preserve the Protectionists’ concern for due process
rights444 by leaving room to rule that a singular omission—such as the lack
of adequate witness protection—is enough to outweigh countervailing
judicial interests. Similarly, it reinforces the importance of due process and
adequate defense in the criminal trial process, which plays toward the
Protectionists’ interest in establishing international legal norms and
precedent.445 It also alleviates some of the Foundationalists’ concern for
protecting the domestic national interest in the proceedings446 by
reintroducing the consideration of national reconciliation and restoration
into the judicial equation. Also, by addressing Rwandan national concerns
in their opinions, judges may be able to dispel the sentiment that the
Tribunal is not concerned with Rwandan justice447 and deals in legal
imperialism.448 Such expression of judicial goodwill may prevent debacles
like the Barayagwiza decision in the future, or at minimum quell the uproar
that such an opinion can generate.449 Also, now that the ambiguity over
Rwanda’s penalty structure is most likely resolved,450 this approach also
opens up the possibility that the absence of one factor—complete witness
protection451—is by itself insufficient to outweigh the other due process
protections and countervailing interests together, thus allowing the Tribunal
to permit transfer to Rwanda.452
2. Uniform Application for All Transfer Cases
The standards the Tribunal uses to evaluate transfer cases, regardless of
the requested transfer country, must be consistent in order to avoid
appearances of legal imperialism and dealing in double standards. The
ICTY Appeals Chamber’s rulings that the court need not consider the actual
application of Bosnia’s law regarding witness protection,453 together with
443. The Prosecutor has already considered the capacity of the Rwandan courts to
prosecute genocide cases in his determination of whether to transfer cases. See id. It follows
that the ICTR may then consider the ability of a case to help the judicial system when
evaluating whether to transfer a defendant to the domestic courts.
444. See supra Part II.A.1.
445. See supra Part II.A.2.
446. See supra notes 321–26 and accompanying text.
447. See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.
448. See supra Part II.B.2.
449. See supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.
450. See supra notes 173–89 and accompanying text.
451. See supra notes 238–46 and accompanying text.
452. This is not to say that the finding of lack of adequate witness protection is
insignificant. The Tribunal may still find that the lack of adequate protections is so
egregious and detrimental to a fair trial that transfer must be denied. This approach merely
opens up the possibility of a different outcome.
453. See supra notes 198–207 and accompanying text.
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the ICTR’s similar rulings regarding the transfer of cases to Europe,454 does
not comport well with the ICTR’s willingness to look beyond Rwandan law
and in fact rule against transfer based on the factual, and not legal,
findings.455 If the Tribunals are sincere in their efforts to establish
international legal norms, such consistency is of paramount importance.
Likewise, the treatment of the 11bis monitoring mechanism should be
accorded the same weight between the ICTY and ICTR, and within the
ICTR, between the Prosecutor and the judges. Both the ICTY and the
ICTR Prosecutor have considered the monitoring mechanism sufficient to
remedy deficiencies in the domestic judicial proceedings.456 It is
particularly glaring that the ICTR Prosecutor has deemed such safeguards
as sufficient457 while the Tribunal has held otherwise.458 This Note
advocates that the ICTR accord greater support and weight toward the use
of monitors to ensure fair trials in transfer countries, in line with the
positions of the Prosecutor and the ICTY. This may be greatly facilitated
by the Tribunal’s recognition of an official monitoring body, or the use of a
body that the Tribunal has already approved, such as the African
Commission.459 Further, if, after transfer, monitors cannot guarantee a fair
trial, the Tribunal may still order the case remanded to Arusha460 and
Rwanda must comply.461 Not only can these mechanisms cure deficiencies
in the domestic proceedings if they arise, the domestic judges’ knowledge
that a case may be compelled back to the Tribunal once transferred to
Rwanda may incentivize them to comport with international standards.462
At any rate, the Rule 11bis(D)(iv) monitoring mechanism should be used to
its maximum potential in facilitating the transfer of cases to national
jurisdictions, in particular Rwanda, where the Prosecutor has already
deemed such mechanism successful.
CONCLUSION
The question of whether to transfer cases from an international tribunal to
a domestic court of a post-conflict country in which the crimes originated
necessitates the consideration of many competing interests. Concerns over
due process protections for the accused and the risk of victor’s justice must
be balanced against the broader goals of national reconciliation, restoration,
and justice for the victims. The repeated refusal of the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to transfer cases to Rwandan courts offers a
454. See supra notes 228–30 and accompanying text.
455. See supra Part I.B.3.c.
456. See supra notes 203, 367–68 and accompanying text.
457. See supra notes 367–68 and accompanying text. This is even more significant given
the fact that the Prosecutor deems monitors sufficient to cure the deficiencies in trials of RPF
officials, where logically concerns of impartiality and government pressure would be
greatest. See supra notes 10, 361 and accompanying text.
458. See supra notes 243–45 and accompanying text.
459. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
460. See supra notes 148–48 and accompanying text.
461. See supra notes 75–81 and accompanying text.
462. See supra notes 210–14 and accompanying text.
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perfect microcosm for analysis of this issue. To date, the Tribunal has
weighed heavily in favor of ensuring all due process protections in the
transfer state, to the exclusion of considering the other founding principles
of the ICTR. However, the Tribunal should instead adopt a comprehensive
balancing approach in which it weighs all pressing judicial interests
together in making its evaluation. This, together with a renewed confidence
in monitoring mechanisms, may alter how the Tribunal and other
international institutions approach this issue.
This is a crucial time for the ICTR to reevaluate its standards for transfer.
As the Tribunal has just once again pushed back its completion strategy
deadline, the transfer of cases to Rwanda becomes even more important.
Since Rwanda has removed all ambiguity from its laws pertaining to the
applicable punishment in transfer cases, the only remaining obstacle is
adequate witness protection. Utilizing a multifaceted balancing approach
combined with a renewed confidence in trial monitoring, the Tribunal may
be able to reconsider its position regarding transferring cases to Rwanda.
More generally, although the era of the ad hoc system is drawing to a close,
other international courts will most likely continue to supplement and
operate in tandem with the ICC. Questions of how to deal with competing
national and international jurisdictional claims are unlikely to disappear
from the international legal discourse.

